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FAILED ExPERIMENT?

A FAILED EXPERIMENT?
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION: TEN YEARS LATER
JAMES STRIBOPOULOS*
Ten years ago, the Ontario Court of Appeal
introduced the investigative detention power to
Canada with its decision in R. v. Simpson. After
providing some necessary background about the
realities of police detention practices, the author
offers a critical evaluation of Simpson and the
ancillarypowers doctrinethat it reliedupon to create
this new police power. The author then proceeds to
consider how well the investigative detention
experiment hasfaredover the last decade, examining
whether it has lived up to the goal that provided its
inspiration,namely, the regulationofpolice detention
practices. The author advances two major claims.
First,the investigativedetentioncases have done little
to regulate but much to legitimize police detention
practices,mostly serving to blur the line between the
detentions they endorse and conventional arrests.
Second, the investigative detention experiment holds
larger lessons about the dangers inherent when
courts, as opposed to legislatures, create police
powers. Given these dangers,the papercontends that
the ancillarypowers doctrineshould be rejected as a
device for creating complex police powers, like
investigative detention. Instead, the author draws
upon the dialogue model, already embraced by the
Supreme Court of Canada, to offer an alternative
approach.He concludes by outlining steps the Court
could take to encourage Parliament tofinally enact
the sort of clear, comprehensive, and prospective
rules and procedures that are essential if police
detention practices are to be effectively regulatedin
the future.

Ily a dix ans, avec la dicision R. c. Simpson, la Cour
d'appel de l'Ontario a introduit le pouvoir de
ddtentionparenquire au Canada.Aprbs avoirfourni
de I 'informationndcessaire au sujet des rdalitds des
pratiquesde ditention,I 'auteurdonne une dvaluation
critique de I 'affaire Simpson et de la doctrine de la
compdtence accessoire qui a servi de base t6 ce
nouveaupouvoir de police. L auteurexamine ensuite
le succbs que cet essai de pouvoir de ddtention a
connu depuis dix ans examinant s'il a permis
d 'atteindrel 'objecti(fdon 'tila dtd inspirg,notamment
la rdglementation des pratiques de ditention de Ia
police. L auteur fait valoir deux points tr~s
importants. Tout d'abordque les cas de ditentionpar
enqudte ont fait peu de choses en termes de
rdglementation mais ont plut6t ldgalisg les pratiques
de ditention de la police, c 'est-6-dire que cela a
surtoutpermisd 'estomperla ligne entre les detentions
qu'elle endosse et les arrestations habituelles.
Ensuite, cet essai nous donne une meilleure legon au
sujet des risques prisentds lorsque les tribunaux,
contrairement aux autoritdsldgislatives, crdent des
pouvoirs policiers. Compte tenu de ces risques,
I'articlepritend que la doctrine de la compdtence
accessoire devrait dtre rejetie 6t titre de recours de
crdation de pouvoirs complexes de Ia police, comme
cetteforme de ddtention. L 'auteurs 'inspireplutdt du
moddle de dialogue,ddj6 adoptipar la Coursuprime
du Canada, comme solution de rechange. Il conclut
qu 'en dtablissant des 6tapes que la Cour pourrait
suivre pour encourager le Parlement pour, en
definitive, adopterles ribgles et lesprocdduresclaires,
compldtes et prospectivesqui sont essentielles si 1'on
veut rdglementer efficacement les pratiques de
ddtentions policidresli l'avenir.
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I. INTRODUCTION

It has been ten years since the term "investigative detention" first entered the Canadian
criminal justice lexicon. Prior to 1993, with very few exceptions, Canadian law did not
authorize the police to detain individuals short of arresting them. At least in theory, the police
had only two options when dealing with persons they suspected of wrongdoing: arrest
(assuming they possessed the required reasonable and probable grounds) or let them go. All
of this changed when the Ontario Court of Appeal decided R. v. Simpson.'
In Simpson, the Court was convinced that, despite a lack of formal authority, investigative
stops were a routine part of police patrol practices. It was in a stated effort to "regulate" such
encounters that the Court went on to recognize a police power at common law to detain for
investigative purposes in situations where the police have articulable cause (that is,
reasonable suspicion) to believe that an individual is implicated in criminal activity. 2 In the

2

R. v. Simpson (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 182,79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.) [Simpson cited to C.C.C.].
Ibid., indicating at 498 that "[u]nless and until Parliament or the legislature acts, the common law ...
must provide the means whereby the courts regulate the police power to detain for investigatory
purposes" [emphasis added].
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intervening years, most Canadian appellate courts have followed Simpson, granting this new
investigative tool to police officers across the country.
To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has not directly addressed these developments.' It
appears as though this is about to change, however, as the Court recently granted leave in a
case that will place the status of this new police power squarely before it.' Accordingly, this
seems a fitting time to evaluate how effective the investigative detention experiment has been
in achieving the goal that provided its inspiration: the regulation of police detention practices.
This article begins in Part II with some essential background, examining the historic divide
between the formal limits on police investigative stops and the realities of police practices.
This section is followed in Part Ill by a careful examination of the decision in Simpson. That
judgment is critically evaluated, as is the "ancillary powers doctrine" the Court relied upon
to create a police investigative detention power. Once this essential background is in place,
the focus shifts in Part IV to a consideration of whether Simpson has lived up to its goal of
"regulating" police investigative stops. In making this assessment, the article proceeds from
the assumption that the best way to control police power is by confining, structuring, and
checking the exercise of discretion. 6 Finally, Part V explores the larger lessons to be learned
from the investigative detention experiment.
The article advances two major claims. First, Simpson and its progeny have raised more
questions than they have answered. In the process, the investigative detention cases have
done little to "regulate," but much to expand and thereby legitimize police authority. The
result has been a blurring of the line between the investigative detentions endorsed by these
cases and those encounters historically characterized as arrests. Second, the investigative
detention experiment holds larger lessons about the dangers inherent when courts, as opposed
to legislatures, create police investigative powers. Although the authority to conduct
investigative stops is of critical importance to the police, the creation of a new police power
of detention is better left to Parliament. Unfortunately, as long as the courts remain willing
to fill the legislative lacuna, meaningful controls will not be forthcoming, as Parliament will
continue to lack any incentive to take needed action in this area.

6

See R. v. Ferris(1998), 162 D.L.R. (4th) 87, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) [Ferriscited to C.C.C.];
R. v. Dupuis (1994), 162 A.R. 197 (C.A.) [Dupuis]; R. v. Lake [1997] 5 W.W.R. 526, (1996), 113
C.C.C. (3d) 208 (Sask. C.A.) [Lake cited to CCC.]; R. v. G.(C.M) (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 76 (C.A.);
R. v. Pigeon [1993] R.J.Q. 2774, (1993), 59 Q.A.C. 103 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Carson(1998), 207 N.B.R.
(2d) 39, 39 M.V.R. (3d) 55 (C.A.); R. v. Chabot (1993), 126 N.S.R. (2d) 355, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 309
(C.A.); R. v. Burke (1997), 153 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 (Nfld. C.A.).
See infra note 106, detailing those cases in which the Supreme Court has cited Simpson yet carefully
avoided passing upon the investigative detention power that it created.
See R. v. Mann [2002] 11 W.W.R. 435, (2002), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 272 (Man. C.A.) [Mann cited to
C.C.C.], leave granted 27 March 2003 S.C.C. Bulletin, 2003 at 511.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Discretion (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1975). In his
groundbreaking work, Davis recognized the dangers of too little and too much discretion, arguing that
"[u]nnecessary discretion must be eliminated. But discretion often is necessary and often must be
preserved. Necessary discretion must be properly confined, structured, and checked" (ibid at 170). See
also Kenneth Culp Davis, DiscretionaryJustice:A PreliminaryInquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University, 1969) at 25-26, 42, 94-95 [Davis, DiscretionaryJustice].
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INVESTIGATIVE STOPS: LAW VS. REALITY

THE ABSENCE OF A COMMON LAW POWER

The Anglo-Canadian common law constitution has long required that any interference with
individual liberty be based on lawful authority. This central tenet of the rule of law - known
7
as the "principle of legality" - demands that "every official act must be justified by law."
Absent some legal justification suggesting otherwise, the right to liberty is presumed. In
effect, individuals are considered to be in a state of perpetual freedom. Restraints on liberty
are viewed as the exception and not the rule.
A lawful arrest has long been considered one of these exceptions. Historically, first at
common law' and later through legislation, 9 police officers have had the authority to interfere
with an individual's liberty by carrying out an arrest, provided that the officer possessed the
requisite reasonable and probable grounds.'" Short of that, however, the cases and the
commentary seemed clear: police did not have the power to detain for investigative
purposes." In fact, prior to Simpson, this proposition seemed virtually unassailable,

See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed., looseleaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997),
who refers to it as the "principle of validity" at 31-4). See also L.H. Leigh, Police Powers in England
and Wales, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1985), who refers to it as the "principle of legality" at 3233. For a classic statement of this principle of English constitutional law, see also Albert V. Dicey,
Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1915) at 198,
203-204.
At common law, a constable had both a right and a duty to arrest if he had reasonable grounds to believe
that an individual had or was about to commit a felony. In contrast, warrantless misdemeanour arrests
were only permitted in cases involving a breach of the peace. See James Stribopoulos, "Unchecked
Power: The Constitutional Regulation of Arrest Reconsidered" (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 225 (outlining
the common law relating to arrest powers at 235-36).
See Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 552 (authorizing the warrantless arrest of persons "found"
committing certain enumerated offences). Today, arrest powers remain in the Criminal Code. See
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 494 and 495 [Criminal Code or Code].
See Criminal Code, ibid., s. 495(1)(a) which contains the arrest power most commonly resorted to by
police. It authorizes a police officer to arrest without a warrant a person who, "on reasonable grounds,
he believes has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence" (ibid.). See also R. v. Storrey
[1990] 1 S.C.R.241, (1990), 53 C.C.C.(3d) 316 [Storrey cited to C.C.C.], holding that a police officer
must subjectively believe reasonable grounds exist and that those grounds must also be objectively
reasonable.
See R. v. Klimchuk (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at 403, 8. C.R. (4th) 327 (B.C.C.A.) [Klimchuk cited
to C.C.C.]; R. v. Hicks (1988), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 394 at 400 (Ont. C.A.), affid on other grounds [1990]
1S.C.R. 120, (1988), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 575; R. v. Moran (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at 258 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Esposito (1985), 53 O.R. (2d) 356, 24 C.C.C.(3d) 88 at 94 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.CC.
refused, [1986] 1 S.C.R. viii [Esposito cited to C.C.C.]; R.v. Dedman (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 641, 59
C.C.C. (2d) 97 at 108-109 (C.A.), affd on other grounds [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2, (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 97
[Dedman cited to C.C.C. at S.CC.]; Cluett v. The Queen (1982), 3 C.C.C. (3d) 333 at 347-48 (Ont.
C.A.), rev'd on other grounds [1985] 2 S.C.R. 216, (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 318; R. v. Guthrie (1982),
39 A.R. 435, 69 C.C.C. (2d) 216 at 218-19 (Alta. C.A.); Moore v. The Queen [1979] 1 S.C.R. 195,
(1978), 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83 at 89-90; Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 Q.B. 414 at 419 (C.A.); Kenlin v.
Gardner, [1967] 2 Q.B. 510 (C.A.); Koechlinv. Waugh and Hamilton (1958), 118 C.C.C. 24 at 26-27
(Ont. C.A.); Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada, 3d ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) at 1072;
Alan Young, "All Along The Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function" (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall L.J. 329 at 330, 343; David C. McDonald, Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 303-304: Canada, Law Commission of
Canada, Arrest, Working Paper 41 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1985) at 33, 37; Steve
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especially given the clarity with which some of the most respected criminal lawjurists in the
country had spoken on the topic. For example, Chief Justice Dickson had stated:
Short of arrest, the police have never possessed legal authority at common law to detain anyone against his
or her will for questioning, or to pursue an investigation.... [P]olice lack legal authority to detain a person for
questioning or for purposes of investigation at common law, even on suspicion, short of arrest.12

Similarly, Justice Martin of the Ontario Court of Appeal had indicated that:
A police officer, when he is endeavouring to discover whether or by whom an offence has been committed,
is entitled to question any person, whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks that useful information can
be obtained. Although a police officer is entitled to question any person in order to obtain information with
respect to a suspected offence, he, as a general rule, has no power to compel the person questioned to answer.
Moreover, he has no power to detain a person for questioning, and ifthe person questioned declines to
answer, the police officer must allow him to proceed on his way unless he arrests him on reasonable and
probable grounds. 13

Again, the implications of these cases and the quoted passages could not have been clearer:
Canadian police did not have a power to detain suspected wrongdoers except by arresting
them.
B.

THE REALITY OF POLICE PRACTICES

Despite this historic lack of formal power, police investigative stops based on grounds
falling short of those required for an arrest have long been a reality in Canada."4 This is not
at all surprising. In the field, the distinction between mere suspicion and the reasonable and
probable grounds needed for an arrest can be meaningless. Rather, if a police officer
encounters someone who arouses his or her suspicions, that person will be approached,
questioned, and possibly searched. If the individual does not acquiesce to police authority,
some level of physical restraint will follow. In either case, the suspect will remain under
police control until the officer's suspicion of wrongdoing is either confirmed (leading to an
arrest) or dispelled (resulting in release). Such stops will persist regardless of their legal
status because the police understandably see such street-level detentions as essential to the

"

1
14

Coughlan, "Police Detention for Questioning: A Proposal" (1985) 28 Crim. L.Q. 64 at 66, 77; Canada,
Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections, Towards Unity: CriminalJustice and Corrections
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 56-57 (Chair: Roger Ouimet).
Dedman, ibid. at 104, 106, Dickson C.J.C., dissenting. The majority did not take exception to these
general statements of principle; ibid. at 121. Dedman is discussed in detail below; see infra notes 61
through 80 and accompanying text.
Esposito, supra note 11 at 94 [emphasis added].
Young argued that detention short of arrest is a mainstay of aggressive patrol practices and advocated
forjudicial and legislative efforts to regulate such practices; supra note I I at 330-41,367-68. See also
Paul C. Weiler, "The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Canadian Tort Lawyer" in
Allen M. Linden, Studies in Canadian Tort Law:A Volume of Essays on the Lawv of Torts Dedicated
to the Memory ofthe Late Dean CA. Wright (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) 416, writing in the preCharter era, he noted at 437-40 that "detention for investigation" was common, although "outside the
law."
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performance oftheir functions. They are "part and parcel of the routine activities of all police
forces."' 5
Indeed, much can be said in favour of vesting the police with the authority to conduct
investigative detentions. The fiction in the pre-Simpson cases is difficult to deny. The idea
that police officers readily distinguish between suspicion and the reasonable and probable
grounds needed for an arrest has not been borne out by experience. 6 Policing is a
complicated and challenging business. In court, viewed calmly through the dispassionate lens
of the trial process, with the benefit of hindsight, the options available to a police officer can
seem deceptively clear. In contrast, for that same officer on the street, as events unfold
quickly, there may be little opportunity for self-reflection when making a decision. If a
suspicious situation presents itself, an officer must be able to take immediate action in
response. The sophisticated but guilty suspect - astute enough to ask "am I under arrest?"
- should not be able to scuttle a police officer's inquiries by choosing to walk away before
an officer's legitimate suspicions have crystallized into grounds for an arrest. In such-cases,
a police officer should be legally entitled to briefly maintain the status quo in order to
quickly get to the bottom of things. To refuse the police such a power is to deny them a
needed tool in the performance of their difficult duties.
C.

THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE

Nevertheless, it would be naive to think that the police should be granted such a power
unconditionally. Throughout the twentieth century, Canadian police have increasingly come
to see themselves as "crime fighters" engaged in a war against crime and those who
perpetrate it.' 7 Even though this crime-fighting self-image is more rhetoric than reality," its
potential influence on how the police fulfill their crime control and order maintenance
functions should not be underestimated. On the street, the unchecked enthusiasm of some
police officers can undoubtedly lead to unjustified stops. Given the recent move in many

15

'

17

18

Young, supra note 11 at 330.
Canada, Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP, Annual Report 1997-1998 (Ottawa:
Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1999) (Chair: Shirley Heafey). The
Commission noted that RCMP officers "do not always distinguish between evidence that creates a
suspicion from evidence that constitutes reasonable grounds for believing that a person has committed
a crime" (ibid. at 14).
See Greg Marquis, "Power from the Street: The Canadian Municipal Police" in R.C. Macleod & David
Schneiderman, eds., Police Powers in Canada: The Evolution and Practiceof Authority (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994) 24 at 30-3 1.
See Jack R. Green & Carl B. Klockars, "What Police Do" in Carl B. Klockars & Stephen. D.
Mafstrofski, eds., Thinking About Police: ContemporaryReadings, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1991) 273, noting at 275 that studies suggest that only a small fraction of police work involves fighting
crime.
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Canadian cities 9 towards "community policing"2 models whose crime reduction benefits are
said to be linked to "aggressive field interrogation and proactive citizen street contacts,",21 the
potential for police abuses can only increase.22 In deciding whom to target for detention as
part of these efforts, police officers will frequently rely upon intuitive assessments that a
particular individual seems "out of place" or "suspicious., 23 As a result, the potential for
unjustified stops is ever-present. Even more troubling, however, is the mounting evidence
that these sorts of discretionary judgments by Canadian police are not free from the oblique
influence of factors such as an individual's age, sex, socio-economic status, or race.24
Although using any of these personal characteristics as a proxy for individualized suspicion
is troubling, the most pernicious and, therefore, most controversial variable on this list is
obviously race.
Over the last decade, the existence of racial discrimination within the Canadian criminal
justice system has received official recognition, initially through the findings of government

1'

20

21

22

23

24

See Curt Taylor Griffiths, Richard B. Parent & Brian Whitelaw, Community Policing In Canada
(Scarborough: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2001) at 19, who noted that in Canada, "the philosophy of
community policing is having a significant impact on the structure and delivery of policing services."
Community policing strategies have been implemented by police forces in cities and regions across the
country (ibid. at 178-200). See also Paul F. McKenna, Foundations of Community Policing in Canada
(Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 2000) at 295-334.
In theory, "community policing" contemplates a cooperative dynamic between citizens and the police
aimed at solving contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical
disorder, and neighbourhood conditions. See Robert Trojanowicz et al., Community Policing: A
Contemporary Perspective, 2d ed. (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1998) at 3-24, In practice, this often
translates into little more than taking officers out of patrol cars and putting them on the street "through
foot patrols, park-and-walk patrols and fixed police posts"; see David H. Bayley, "Community Policing:
A Report From The Devil's Advocate" in Jack R. Green & Stephen D. Mastrofksi, eds., Community
Policing: Rhetoric Or Reality (New York: Praeger, 1988) 225 at 229 [Rhetoric or Reality].
Lawrence W. Sherman, "Policing Communities: What Works?" in Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry,
eds., Communities and Crime, Vol. 8 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) 343, noted that
studies have shown that these sorts of contacts result in lower recorded crime rates at 369. But see Jack
R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, "Community-Based Policing And Foot Patrol: Issues Of Theory And
Evaluation" in Rhetoric or Reality, ibid. 195 at 206-19, questioning whether the studies actually
support crime-reduction claims.
See Stephen M. Mastrofski, "Community Policing As Reform: A Cautionary Tale" in Rhetoric or
Reality, ibid. at 47. Mastrofski noted that "aggressive order maintenance strategies" are often integral
components of community policing efforts and can include "rousting and arresting people thought to
cause public disorder, field interrogations and roadblock checks, surveillance of suspicious people,
vigorous enforcement of public order and nuisance laws, and, in general, much greater attention to the
minor crimes and disturbances thought to disrupt and displease the civil public" (ibid. at 53). See also
Griffiths et al., supra note 19 at 64, who noted that, as part of community policing efforts, "aggressive
patrol may involve car stops, person checks, zero-tolerance enforcement, and other crackdowns" and
cautioned that "officers must ensure that their actions do not violate the citizens' rights guaranteed in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'"
See e.g. R. v. Grafe (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 267 (Ont. C.A.) at 268; the officer testified that he
approached the accused because he was "continuing to watch the cruiser as it approached" and,
according to the officer, there was "something not quite kosher" about such behaviour.
See Richard V. Ericson, Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1982) at 16-17, 200-201, noting that the police tend to proactively stop young males of
lower socio-economic status and that, depending on the region, race may also play a role - for
example, blacks in certain urban areas or Native Canadians in rural areas on the Prairies.
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commissions and inquiries, and later in the opinions of Canadian courts.25 In the case of
Aboriginal people, a number of studies have acknowledged the existence of widespread
racism, resulting in systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system.26 Similarly, the
Commission On Systemic Racism in the Ontario CriminalJusticeSystem found that blacks
are subject to discriminatory treatment at several key stages of the criminal process.27 The
official studies served to confirm what anecdotal evidence had long suggested, namely, that
the Aboriginal and black communities are over-policed. 2"
Cogent evidence has recently emerged to suggest that both Aboriginals29 and blacks" are
stopped by police at considerably higher rates than members of other racial groups. For
example, after surveying respondents about their experiences over a two year period, a study
by the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario CriminalJustice System found that,
"after controlling for other variables, blacks are twice as likely as whites or Asians to
experience a single stop ...four times more likely to experience multiple stops ... and almost

25

26

27

2

29

30

SeeR. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 504 and R. v. Gladue, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 688, (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at 411, each acknowledging the existence of "widespread
racism" and "systemic discrimination" against Aboriginals in the criminal justice system. See also R.
v. S.(R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, (1997), 118 C.C.C. (3d) 353, wherein the Court acknowledged
"widespread and systemic discrimination against black and aboriginal people" at 372; R. v. Parks
(1993), 15 O.R. (3d) 324, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (C.A.), acknowledging "anti-black racism" at 366-69.
See also R. v. Brown (2003), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 23, 170 O.A.C. 131 (C.A.) at paras. 7-9 [Brown]; and R.
v. C.R.H. (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 67, 2003 MBCA 38 at para. 49, acknowledging the existence of and
potential for "racial profiling." See e.g. R. v. Peck, [20011 O.J. No. 4581 (S.C.J.) (QL), in which the
Court found that the race of the accused - a young black male - was consciously relied upon in
deciding to make a stop.
See Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on
Aboriginal People andCriminalJustice in Canada (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996)
at 33; Canada, Royal Commission On The Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution, Digest of FindingsAnd
Recommendations (Halifax: The Commission, 1989) at 162. See also Manitoba, Public Inquiry into the
Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report of the AboriginalJustice Inquiry ofManitoba
(Winnipeg: The Inquiry, 1991) at 96-113 [Report on AboriginalJustice in Manitoba]; Canada, Task
Force on the Criminal Justice System and Its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice
on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and Its Impact on the Indian and
Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: The Task Force, 1991) at 2-5, 2-46 to 2-51 [Justice on Trial].
See Ontario, Commission On Systemic Racism In The Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report
(Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995) [Report On Systemic Racism In The Ontario Criminal
Justice System].
See Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, "Race, Ethnicity and Criminal Justice in Canada" in
Michael Tonry, ed., Ethnicity,Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives,
vol. 21 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997) 469 at 519, noting that: "[c]ommon to the
research on Aboriginals and blacks is the finding that discrimination effects are probably strongest at
the policing stage."
See Report on Aboriginal Justice in Manitoba, supra note 26 at 595; Justice on Trial, supra note 26
at 2-6, 2-48, 2-49.
See Report On Systemic Racism In The Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 27 at 349-60. See
also Scot Wortley, "The Usual Suspects: Race, Police Stops and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice
(Paper presented at the 48th Annual Conference of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago,
November, 1997) Criminol. [forthcoming] [Wortley]; Carl James, "'Up To No Good:' Black on the
Streets and Encountering Police" in Vic Satzewich, ed., Racism and Social Inequality in Canada:
Concepts,Controversies,andStrategiesofResistance (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1998)at 157;
Robynne Neugebauer, "Kids, Cops, and Colour: The Social Organization of Police-Minority Youth
Relations" in Robynne Neugebauer, ed., Criminal Injustice: Racism in the CriminalJustice System
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2000); Jim Rankin et al., "Police Target Black Drivers Star
analysis of traffic data suggests racial profiling" Toronto Star (20 October 2002) A8.

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION:

A

FAILED EXPERIMENT?

343

seven times more likely to experience an unfair stop."'" These studies serve to reveal an
unfortunate truth: in carrying out proactive stops, Canadian police sometimes use race as a
substitute for objectively reasonable grounds.
None of this is intended to suggest that overt racism is rampant among Canadian police;
the empirical evidence does not go that far. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that racism exists
in Canada. Given this fact, it would be dangerous to presume that discretionary decisionmaking by police officers is somehow immune from its caustic effects. As with any group,
there are undoubtedly some police officers who consciously act on the basis of racial
stereotypes. Sadly, in deciding who to stop, these officers will invariably target members of
minority groups whom they consider more likely to be engaged in wrongdoing and therefore
more deserving of closer scrutiny. 2
A much more likely danger, however, is that many police officers subconsciously operate
on the basis of stereotypical assumptions regarding visible minorities. For these officers, the
facts that tweak suspicion - "the commission of a 'furtive gesture,' an 'attempt to flee,'
'evasive' eye movements, 'excessive nervousness' - will not be accurate renditions of the
suspect's actual behavior, but rather, a report that has been filtered through and distorted by
the lens of stereotyping."33 In a recent decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal made clear that
regardless of whether a stop is the product of conscious or subconscious racial bias, the
appropriate label for such discriminatory police practices is "racial profiling."' 4 For our

.2

33
34

Wortley, ibid. at 19. For comparative purposes, this study controlled for age, gender, income,
employment status and education - "unfair stops" were those that respondents self-reported as
involving "unfair" treatment by police.
If police attitudes are reflective of those within Canadian society, this conclusion is somewhat
inescapable. See Roberts & Doob, supra note 28 at 485, citing a 1995 Gallup poll of Canadians in
which 45 percent of respondents indicated that there was a link between ethnicity and crime and, ofthis
group, two-thirds identified blacks as the minority most likely to be involved in crime.
Anthony C. Thompson, "Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment" (1999) 74
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 956 at 991.
Brown, supra note 25. At para. 7, the Court cited Rosenburg J.A. who, in an earlierjudgment (R. v.
Richards (1999), 26 C.R. (5th) 286), explained that
[r]acial profiling is criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour profiling refers to that
phenomenon whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an identified group in society on
the basis of race or colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group. In this
context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal propensity
of an entire racial group.
The Court in Brown continued: "The attitude underlying racial profiling is one that may be consciously
or unconsciously held. That is, the police officer need not be an overt racist. His or her conduct may be
based on subconscious racial stereotyping" (ibid. at para. 8). For a discussion of racial profiling in
Canada, see David M. Tanovich, "Using the Charter To Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of An
Equality Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention" (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J.
145.
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purposes, the important point is that race can sometimes inappropriately influence the police
in choosing whom to stop for investigative purposes.3"
A final consideration in outlining the divide between law and reality in this area is the low
visibility of unjustified street level detentions. Arguably, of all police practices none is more
secluded and, therefore, as susceptible to abuse as street level detentions. This flows from
the very nature of such encounters. If an individual is detained without cause, chances are
that he or she is innocent of any wrongdoing, in which case such stops do not yield evidence
of criminality. It is only in those comparatively rare cases of unjustified detentions where a
person happens to be guilty of wrongdoing and evidence of this is fortuitously acquired
during the stop - for instance, the individual confesses or a search reveals contraband that an arrest and charge(s) follow. Otherwise, in most instances, the victim of a groundless
detention is ultimately released. As a result, courts get a very incomplete picture of what is
taking place on the street; the cases they see "are only the tip of the iceberg. 36
With this necessary background in place, we are now ready to embark on a consideration
of Simpson and the investigative detention power that it created. Before moving forward, it
is useful to briefly reiterate the lessons from this Part. First, although the common law
foreclosed the possibility of investigative detentions by police, in reality these sorts of stops
have long been a part of police practice. Second, irrespective of their legal status, such stops
will continue because the police consider them essential to the effective performance of their
functions. Third, given both their inevitability and their importance to the effective discharge
of police duties, it makes sense to formally vest the police with an investigative detention
power. Fourth, due to the very real risk of abuse, any such power should be carefully
regulated. Finally, when assessing which branch - the legislative or the judicial - is best
suited to create and regulate such a power, it ought to be remembered that courts only see a
very small fraction of the cases in which police authority to detain has been abused.

35

.36

In some circumstances, it is perfectly legitimate for police to rely upon an individual's race in deciding
to effect astop; see Samuel R.Gross & Debra Livingston, "Racial Profiling Under Attack" (2002) 102
Colum. L. Rev. 1413 at 1415:
It is not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, arrest, or otherwise investigate a
person because his race or ethnicity matches information about a perpetrator of aspecific crime
that the officer is investigating. That use of race - which usually occurs when there is a racially
specific description of the criminal - does not entail a global judgment about aracial or ethnic
group as a whole.
Young, supra note II at 355. See also Stephen D.Mastrofski & Jack R.Greene, "Community Policing
and the Rule of Law" in David Weisburd & Craig Uchida, eds., Police Innovation and Control of the
Police: Problems of Law, Order, and Community (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993) 80 at 85 [Police
Innovation and Control], noting that "the system for monitoring police compliance is limited to those
relatively few instances where police actions are made visible in cases that receive review in court."

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION:

II. R.

A.

A

FAILED EXPERIMENT?

345

V.SIMPSON: THE BIRTH OF ARTICULABLE CAUSE
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTIONS

CLEARING THE WAY FOR AN INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION POWER

The facts in Simpson are straightforward.37 On the evening of 5 December 1989, Constable
Wilkin was on routine patrol. He had recently read an internal police memo citing an
unidentified street source that described a particular residence as a "suspected crack house."
That night, he observed a car in the driveway of that house. The driver, a woman, exited the
car and entered the house, where she stood in the doorway. A short time later, she and a man
(Simpson) emerged from the house and drove off in the car. Constable Wilkin followed. He
testified to having had "every intention of pulling them over to ask them where they had
been, to see what story they were going to give me, see whether any of their story would
substantiate what I believed my information to be at the time ...I was looking for them ...

to trip themselves up to give me more grounds for an arrest."38
After a short drive, Constable Wilkin pulled the vehicle over. He directed the woman, who
was driving, to sit in the police cruiser and she complied. The officer then directed Simpson
to step out of the car, which he did. During their short conversation, the officer noticed a
bulge in Simpson's front pant pocket. The officer reached out and felt the bulge, which was
hard. Nonetheless, when asked what it was, Simpson insisted that it was nothing. At that
point, Constable Wilkin directed Simpson to remove the object. Simpson took it from his
pocket quickly, in an apparent effort to throw it away. After a short struggle, the officer
managed to remove a baggie containing cocaine from Simpson's hand. Simpson was then
arrested and charged with possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking.39
At his trial, Simpson unsuccessfully argued that the cocaine should be excluded from
evidence under s. 24(2) of the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms.4" The argument
had two bases: first, he contended that the vehicle stop had violated his s. 9 Charterright
"not to be arbitrary detained"'" and second, he claimed that the direction to empty his pocket
42
had violated his s. 8 Charter right "to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
Simpson renewed these same arguments on appeal.
The Ontario Court of Appeal judgment in Simpson began with an analysis of the s. 9
Charter issue of whether Simpson had been arbitrarily detained. To trigger the protection of
s. 9, the encounter had to be considered sufficiently coercive to constitute a "detention." Not
every interaction between an individual and the police qualifies for this label: under the case
law, some element of "compulsory restraint" - physical or psychological - is necessary.
Although physical restraint is sufficient, it is not essential. A demand or direction by a law
enforcement official that effectively assumes control over an individual's freedom of

17
38
19
40

41
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Supra note I at 486.
Ibid. at 487.
Ibid.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I I
[Charter].
Supra note I at 488, referencing the Charter, ibid., s. 9.
Supra note I at 505, referencing the Charter, ibid., s. 8.
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movement will also suffice." The test is whether "the person concerned submits or
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the choice to do
otherwise does not exist."44 Given that Simpson was travelling in a vehicle that was stopped
by police, the answer was predetermined by precedent. The Supreme Court had previously
4
held that motor vehicle stops result in a "detention" and engage s. 9 of the Charter. 1
The next step in the s. 9 analysis involved deciding whether the detention was "arbitrary."
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence had made clear that a lawful detention can be arbitrary,
such as when the law that authorizes the detention does so on some arbitrary basis. 46 At the
same time, decisions prior to Simpson had expressly refrained from equating "unlawful" with
"arbitrary." These cases permit an unlawful detention - for example, an arrest based on
something short of the reasonable and probable grounds required by law - to escape the
arbitrariness label in situations where the responsible state official made an honest and
reasonable mistake about the adequacy of his or her grounds. 47 Although there is now
growing consensus among commentators that an unlawful detention should be viewed as
inherently "arbitrary, '4 Simpson serves to maintain this distinction.4 ' The Court made it
clear, however, that if the detention were found to be unlawful, this would "play a central role
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R. v. Therens, [198511 S.C.R. 613, (1985), 18 C.C.C.(3d) 481 [Therens cited to C.C.C.], Le Dam J.,
dissenting in the result, defined "detention" for the purposes of s. 10 of the Charterat 504-505. See also
R. v. Thomsen, [1988] 1S.C.R. 640, (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 411 at 417-18 [Thomsen cited to C.C.C.];
R. v. Hufsky, [1988] I S.C.R.621, (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 398 at 406 [Hufsky cited C.C.C.]. The Court
in each case held that "detained" under s. 9 had the same meaning.
Therens, ibid. at 505.
Supra note I at 486, citing Hufsky, supra note 43 at 406; R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257,
(1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 22 at 36-37 [Ladouceur cited to C.C.C.]; R. v. Wilson, [1990]1 S.C.R. 1291,
(1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 142 [Wilson cited to C.C.C.]. The Court in each case held that compliance with
a police officer's direction to stop one's vehicle, after emphasizing the legal consequences of refusing
to stop, results in a "detention."
Supra note I at 487. A law will authorize detention on an arbitrary basis if it mandates a loss of liberty
without the need to consider any rational criteria or standards; see R. v. Swain, [1991] I S.C.R. 933,
(1991), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 535-36 [Swain cited to C.C.C.]; Lyons v. The Queen, [198712 S.C.R.
309, (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) I at 36, or if it confers unfettered discretion on state agents to detain
individuals by providing no criteria as to when detention is permissible; see Hufsky, supra note 43 at
407. See also Ladouceur,supra note 45 at 37; R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, (1992), 77 C.CC.
(3d) 91 at 109; R. v. Pearson,[1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, (1992), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 124 at 147.
See R. v. Duguay (1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 375, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (C.A.), affd on other grounds [1989]
1S.C.R. 93, (1989), 46 C.C.C. (3d) I [Duguay cited to C.C.C. at C.A.], which dealt with an unlawful
arrest- i.e., undertaken without reasonable and probable grounds -and suggested that ifthe officer's
grounds fall "just short," and he or she honestly believed that the grounds were adequate, it cannot be
said that such an unlawful arrest was "capricious or arbitrary" (ibid, at 296). See also Klimchuk, supra
note 4 at 414; R. v. Cayer (1988), 66 C.R. (3d) 30 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Capistrano(2000), 149 Man. R.
(2d) 42, 47 W.C.B. (2d) 61 (Q.B.); R. v. Sieben (1989), 99 A.R. 379, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 343 (C.A.); R. v.
Brown (1987), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 64, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 54 (C.A.); R. v. Moore (1988), 89 N.S.R. (2d) 199,
45 C.C.C.(3d) 410 (C.A.); R. v. Pimental(2000), 145 Man. R. (2d) 295, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 653 (C.A.).
See Stribopoulos, supra note 8, arguing that the Duguaydefinition does not accord with the purposive
approach to Charterinterpretation subsequently embraced by the Supreme Court at 266-72. See infra
note 279 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of this argument. See also Hogg, supra
note 7 at 46-5: "Probably, ... strict compliance with the law is a necessary (although not a sufficient)
condition for compliance with s. 9"; Don Stuart, CharterJustice In Canadian CriminalLaw, 3d ed.
(Scarborough: Carswell, 2001) at 263, arguing that such a reading would make s. 9 "a far more
powerful protection."
See supra note I at 488, 504. See also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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0
in determining whether ... [it was] ... also arbitrary."" This set the analytical stage for an
inquiry into whether Constable Wilkin had lawful authority to detain Simpson.

The Crown faced an uphill battle in its effort to justify this stop. By 1993, the Supreme
Court had already held that, unless an unknown informant's tip was compelling and
substantially corroborated, it could not supply the reasonable and probable grounds needed
5
for an arrest or search. ' In Simpson, the internal police memo of an unknown date citing the
bare assertion of an unidentified street source provided little more than suspicion, especially
in relation to the occupants of a car that had had only a brief connection to the suspect
residence.
In an effort to justify the vehicle stop, the Crown pointed to s. 216(1) of the Ontario
Highway Traffic AC. 5 2 That section gives a police officer the authority to direct the driver
of a motor vehicle to stop and obligates that driver to comply. The difficulty for the Crown
was that the Supreme Court of Canada had already concluded that the predecessor provision
- containing the exact same wording - was arbitrary and inconsistent with s. 9 of the

Charter.3 Although the Supreme Court upheld this provision as a reasonable limit under s.
1 of the Charter, citing the statistical evidence documenting the catastrophic human toll
exacted by impaired and unlicensed drivers, it did so subject to a very strong caveat. The s.
1 justification holds in only those cases where a stop is carried out for the purpose of
checking a driver's license, insurance, sobriety, or the mechanical fitness of a vehicle. Any
probing beyond these limited purposes is strictly prohibited and serves to transform a stop
from an encounter which is constitutionally permissible at its inception into an arbitrary
detention.5 4 Given the criminal investigative purpose for the stop in Simpson, the Highway
Traffic Act could not be used as a justification."
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Ibid. at 488.
SeeR. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140,(1989), 52 C.CC. (3d) 193 at 217-18 [Debot cited to C.CC.]:
in cases involving reliance upon "an anonymous tip or on an untried informant ... the quality of the
information and corroborative evidence may have to be such as to compensate for the inability to assess
the credibility of the source."
R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.
See Hufsky, supranote 43, a case involving a fixed point check stop, finding that the predecessor to this
section - s. 189a(1) - authorized arbitrary detentions contrary to s.9 of the Charter; and Ladouceur,
supra note 45, coming to the same conclusion in a case involving random and roving stops. See also
Wilson, supra note 45, which came to the same conclusion regarding s. 119 of the Highway TrafficAct,
R.S.A. 1980, c. H-7. In each case, however, s. I of the Charter was relied upon to uphold the violation.
See Ladouceur, ibid. at 44. See also R. v. Mellenthin, [ 1992]3 S.C.R. 615, (1992), 76 C.CC. (3d) 481
at 487. But see Tanovich, supra note 34, who noted that the majority's s. I analysis in Ladouceur "may
actually contain the seeds of its own demise" at 168. This is because the majority's analysis discounted
concerns about the potential for abuses by concluding that "these fears are unfounded"; Ladouceur,
supra note 45 at 44. Mounting evidence now suggests otherwise; see supra notes 24 through 35 and
accompanying text. This new evidence could lead to a different result if the s. I analysis were to be
revisited in future.
Supra note I at 493. Subsequent case law suggests that as long as road safety is one of the officer's
purposes, the s. Ijustification will be maintained. See Brown v.Durham Regional Police Force (1998),
43 O.R. (3d) 233, 131 C.C.C. (3d) I (C.A.), holding that the police can stop for motor vehicle concerns
while also harbouring ulterior investigative interests, so long as the secondary purpose is not itself
unconstitutional - for instance, a stop undertaken for the purpose of effecting an unconstitutional
search; ibid. at 116-17. See also R.v. Duncanson (1991 ), 12 C R. (4th) 86 (Sask. C.A.), rev'd on other
grounds [1992]1 S.C.R. 836, (1992), 12 C.R. (4th) 98. But see R. v. Gudnette (1999), 136 C.C.C. (3d)
311 (Que. C.A.).
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In the absence of any statutory authority for this stop, the Court then expressed a need to
"consider whether the common law authorized this detention."56 A negative answer to this
question seemed to be dictated by well-established precedent.57 Although it acknowledged
many of these cases, the Simpson Court read them as narrowly as reason would allow.
According to the Court, the precedents simply denied a "general power to detain whenever
that detention will assist a police officer in the execution of his or her duty."58 These
decisions did not foreclose "the authority to detain short of arrest in all circumstances where
the detention has an investigative purpose." 59 This claim was as subtle as it was bold. In
effect, it allowed the Court in Simpson to avoid the difficult and unseemly task of overruling
many of its own decisions.6" After carefully opening a fissure in the precedents, the Court
quickly began to fill it with a new police power. To construct this power, the Simpson Court
relied upon the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Dedman.6" As a result, an
understanding of Dedman, and the ancillary powers doctrine it endorsed, is crucial to truly
understanding Simpson.
A

B.

QUESTIONABLE FOUNDATION:
ANCILLARY POWERS DOCTRINE

R.

V. DEDMAN AND THE

In Dedman, the accused had been stopped at random by police conducting a Reduce
Impaired Driving Everywhere (R.I.D.E.) check-stop program. After the stop, a police officer
had formed the required grounds to make a breath demand. Ultimately, after some
unsuccessful efforts, Dedman failed to furnish a breath sample and was charged under s.
234.1(2) [now s. 254(5)] of the Criminal Code. The facts of the case had preceded the
Charter,so the constitutionality of the stop was not in issue. In the course of defending
himself against the charge, however, Dedman argued that he had a "reasonable excuse" for
not providing the sample: the unlawful nature of the initial stop. At the time, there was no
62
authority for such a stop in either federal legislation or the Ontario Highway Traffic Act.
In Dedman, a closely divided Supreme Court - four justices to three - recognized a
police power at common law to stop motor vehicles at fixed sobriety checkpoints. In doing
so, the majority relied heavily upon R. v. Waterfield.63 In that case, the English Court of
Criminal Appeal had crafted a two part test to be used in deciding whether a police constable
was acting "in execution of his duty" at the time that he was allegedly assaulted - an
essential ingredient of the offence charged.' The Waterfield Court had indicated that
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Simpson, ibid. at 493.
See supra notes I I through 13 and accompanying text.
Supra note I at 495.
Ibid.
See R. v. White (1996), 29 O.R. (3d) 577, 108 C.C.C. (3d) I at 27-30 (C.A.), setting out the Court's
approach to overruling its decisions.

61

Supra note 11.

62

R.S.O. 1970, c. 202. Section 14 of the Act only obligated drivers to surrender their licenses to police

63

upon demand, it did not impose a duty upon motorists to stop, although subsequent amendments did.
See supra notes 52 through 54 and accompanying text.
[1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (Ct. Crim. App.) [Waterfield]. See Dedman, supra note II at 119-22.
One appellant, Lynn, was appealing against his conviction for assaulting a police constable "in the due
execution of his duty" contrary to s. 38 of the Person Act, 1861. The other appellant, Waterfield, was
appealing against his conviction for counselling the commission of that offence. The same issue was
key to the resolution of both their appeals. See Waterfield, ibid. at 660-61.
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In the judgment of this court it would be difficult, and in the present case it is unnecessary, to reduce within
specific limits the general terms in which the duties of police constables have been expressed. In most cases
it is probably more convenient to consider what the police constable was actually doing and in particular
whether such conduct was prima facie an unlawful interference with a person's liberty or property. If so, it is
then relevant to consider whether (a) such conduct falls within the general scope of any duty imposed by
statute or recognised at common law and (b) whether such conduct, albeit within the general scope of such
a duty, involved an unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the duty. Thus, while it isno doubt right
to say in general terms that police constables have a duty to prevent crime and a duty, when crime is
committed, to bring the offender to justice, it is also clear from the decided cases that when the execution of
these general duties involves65interference with the person or property of a private person, the powers of
constables are not unlimited.

At least initially, Canadian courts had applied the Waterfield test in the same limited way
as their English counterparts. The case was used to decide whether a police officer was acting
"in execution of his duty" when an accused allegedly assaulted or obstructed him. In Canada,
as in England, this is an essential element of each of these offences. 66 Thus, at its inception
the test allowed, at the very most, for nothing more than an incremental and indirect
expansion of existing police powers, as individual cases presented themselves for
consideration. This point is best illustrated by the limited way in which English courts have
applied Waterfield.The case has been cited infrequently, and its two-part test has never been
used to justify the creation of an entirely new and invasive police investigative power.67 In

65
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Ibid. at 661.
See R. v. Stenning, [1970] S.C.R. 631, 3 C.C.C. 145 at 149, dealing with a charge of assaulting a police
officer "engaged in the execution of his duties" contrary to what was then s. 232(a) [now s. 270(l )(a)]
ofthe Code; Knowlton v. The Queen, [1974] S.C.R. 443, (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 377 at 380 [Knowlton
cited to C.C.C.], dealing with a charge of obstructing a police officer "in the execution of his duty,"
contrary to what was then s. I 18(a) [now s. 129(a)] of the Code.
Waterfield has only been cited in the following eight cases. See Ghani v, Jones, [1 96913 All. E.R. 1700
at 1703-704 (C.A.); although Lord Denning questioned the result in Waterfield, he did not refer to or
rely upon the two part test; Donnelly v. Jackman, [1970] 1 All E.R. 987 (Q.B.), wherein the appellant's
conviction for assaulting a police officer "in the execution of his duty" was upheld when he responded
to a police officer who wanted to speak to him and who had touched his shoulder in an effort to stop
him by turning around and striking him with "some force." After characterizing the officer's touch as
a "minimal matter," the Court concluded that he was "acting in the execution of his duty when he went
up to the appellant and wanted to speak to him" (ibid. at 988-89); Hoffman v. Thomas, [1974] 2 All
E.R. 233 (Q.B.) [Hoffman], in which the appellant's conviction for refusing to stop when directed to
do so by a "constable in the execution of his duty" contrary to s. 22(l ) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 was
overturned because the constable was said to lack either common law or statutory authority to signal
motorists to stop for this purpose and, consequently, "that signal cannot have been an act in the
execution of his duty" (at 237-38); Johnson v. Phillips, [1975] 3 All E.R. 682 at 685-86 (Q.B.), where
the Court upheld the appellant's conviction for wilfully obstructing a police constable "in the execution
of his duty" contrary to s. 51(3) of the Police Act 1964 after he refused a constable's direction that he
move his car, which was blocking the removal of injured persons to an ambulance; and Coffin v. Smith
(1980), 71 Cr. App. R. 221 (D.C.), considering the dismissal of charges against two youths accused of
assaulting a police constable "in the execution of his duty" contrary to s. 5 1(1) of the Police Act 1964.
The two youths had been asked by the officers to leave a Boys' Club and, after initially complying, they
returned and assaulted the officers. After applying the Waterfield test, both judges disagreed with the
result below, concluding that the officers "were in effect simply standing there on their beat in the
execution of their duty when they were assaulted" by the two accused (ibid at 226-27). See also Oxford
v. Austin [1981] RTR 416 at 419 (Q.B.), wherein the Court referred to a passage from Waterfield
indicating that it is a question of fact for a jury whether or not a place qualifies as a "road" under s.
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fact, in one of the last English decisions that refers to Waterfield, the Court noted that while
the "common law evolves" through "a delicate process," the creation of a new police
investigative power would represent a "violent change," which is "a matter for Parliament
rather than the courts."6 Incidentally, police powers in England - including the authority
to detain and search suspects based on reasonable suspicion - were subsequently the subject
of comprehensive legislation by Parliament.69
The majority in Dedman was no doubt anxious to do its part in combatting the evils of
drinking and driving. Unfortunately, in the process, it seriously misread how the English
courts had applied the two-part Waterfield test. Initially, at least, the Dedman majority
correctly noted that "[t]he test laid down in Waterfield... [was generally]... invoked in cases
in which the issue [was] whether a police officer was acting in the execution his duties."7 °
After excerpting some cryptic references to police "powers" in a few of the English and
Canadian cases that had relied upon Waterfield, however, the majority further indicated that
the test had "been recognized as being a test for whether the officer had common law
authority for what he did."'" This conclusion was taken to justify the conversion of the

6H

69

70
71

196(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1972, the two-part test from Waterfield is not mentioned; McLorie v.
Oxford, [1982] 3 All E.R. 480 at 485 (Q.B.), in which the Court overturned the appellant's convictions
for obstructing and assaulting a police constable "in the execution of his duty," contrary respectively
to ss. 51 (l) and 51(3) of the Police Act 1964, after he forcefully resisted police officers who entered
onto his property without a warrant to remove a car that they believed had been used as a weapon by
the appellant's son, who was arrested "some hours earlier" for attempted murder at that same location.
Although the vehicle could have been taken incidental to the arrest, the Court refused to recognize a
"right of search and/or seizure of material from the scene of an arrest after that arrest has been
completed"; therefore, the police "were not acting in execution of their duty" in entering upon the
appellant's property (ibid); Steel v. Goacher [1983] RTR 98 at 103-104 (Q.B.), where the Court
referred to Waterfield for its interpretation of the forerunner to s.159 of the of the Road Traffic Act
1972 - a provision which obligates drivers to stop when directed to do so by police; its interpretation
was rejected and the decision did not refer to or rely upon the two-part test.
McLorie v. Oxford, ibid.
See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 60 [PACE]. There are a series of
provisions in PACE relating to the authority of police to stop and search individuals based on
"reasonable grounds for suspecting" that they are in possession of"stolen or prohibited articles" (ibid.,
ss. I through 8). It includes provisions which impose a duty upon officers to record the particulars of
each stop; (ibid., s. 3). Other provisions require police forces to compile the data from these individual
reports and make such information public on an annual basis (ibid., s. 5). The Act also authorizes the
Secretary of State to issue Codes of Practice - guidelines that further explain the legislative provisions;
(ibid., ss. 66, 67). In the context of police powers to stop and search, a detailed Code of Practice
elaborates on a number of important issues. See PACE, Code A: Code of Practice for the Exercise of
Police Officers Statutory Powers ofStop and Search, online: Her Majesty's Stationery Office <www.
homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/pacecodea.pdf> [PACE, Code of Practice for Stop and Search]. The Code
includes prohibitions on the misuse of race in deciding who to stop and search (ibid., ss. 1.1, 2.2);
elaborates upon the meaning of"reasonable suspicion" (ibid., ss. 2.2 -2.6, 2.25); places general limits
upon the length of detentions and their location (ibid, s. 1.2, 3.3 - 3.4);
explains the circumstances in
which searches can be carried out, including their manner and scope (ibid., ss. 1.5, 2.9 -2.11, 3.1 3.11); and elaborates on the reporting obligations of police officers after a search is completed, and how
that data is to be compiled and used by police superiors (ibid, ss. 4.1 - 4.10, 5.1 - 5.4).
Dedman, supra note I I at 120.
Ibid. [emphasis added]. The majority relied on the following sources to justify this new use for the
Waterfield test: First, a passage from Hoffman where the Court indicated that the officer's direction to
stop was "a signal which he had no power to make either at common law or by virtue of statute" was
excerpted (supra note 67 at 238 [emphasis added]). Second, the majority pointed to the following
passages from Fauteux C.J.C.'s judgment in Knowlton: "Police duty and the use of powers associated

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION: A FAILED EXPERIMENT?

351

Waterfield test from an aid in assessing whether a police officer was acting in execution of
his duties into something completely different. In effect, the test was transformed into an
expansive law-making mechanism by which courts could vest the police with those ancillary
powers that would assist them in the fulfilment of their broad duties.72 The Dedman majority
ignored the fact that no English or Canadian court had ever used the Waterfield test in this
way before. The Court in Dedman then proceeded to apply the test in deciding whether or
not to recognize a police power to conduct random sobriety check stops.
When put to use for this new law-making purpose, the Waterfield test yielded predictable
results. The majority emphasized that the right to drive around in a vehicle is a "liberty" in
a very qualified sense. Unlike "a fundamental liberty like the ordinary right of movement of
the individual," driving is a "licensed activity that is subject to regulation and control for the
protection of life and property."73 Bearing the qualified nature of the right in mind, the
majority applied the first prong of the Waterfield test and easily concluded that it was
satisfied: random stops fell within the general scope of police officers' duties to prevent
crime and protect life and property by controlling traffic. 74
The Court then considered the second prong of the test, namely whether the police conduct
involved an unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the duty. In making this
assessment, the majority indicated that it was required to consider whether the police conduct
at issue was "necessary for the carrying out of the particular police duty and ... reasonable,
having regard to the nature of the liberty interfered with and the importance of the public
purpose served by the interference."" In effect, the recognition of a new police power turns
upon the Court's weighing of the costs versus the potential benefits. After acknowledging the
arbitrary nature of such stops and the potentially unpleasant psychological effect on drivers,
the Court noted that other factors weigh in their favour, including the well-publicized nature
of these programs and the short duration of such stops. The Court then asserted that, "having
regard to the importance of the public purpose served," such stops do not involve "an

72

73
74
75

with such duty are the sole matters in issue in this appeal" and "1cannot find in the record any evidence
showing that Sergeant Grandish or other police officers resorted, on the occasion, to any unjustifiable
use of the powers associated with the duty imposed upon them" (supra note 66 at 379 [emphasis
added]). Third, the Court quoted from L.H. Leigh, Police Powers in England and Wales (London:
Butterworths, 1975), who wrote that Knowlton reflected a movement "towards an ancillary powers
doctrine which would enable the police to perform such reasonable acts as are necessary for the due
execution of their duties" (ibid. at 33). The majority ignored Leigh's comments expressing skepticism
about using the Waterfield test in this way (see infra, note 72). Finally, the Dedman majority also
pointed to Chief Justice Dickson's judgment in another case, where he dealt with Waterfield under the
heading "The common law powers of the police" (see Reference re an Application for an
Authorization, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 697, (1984), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 466 at 481 [emphasis added]).
The "ancillary powers doctrine" is a term that has been used to describe the use of the Waterfield test
as a means of recognizing new police powers. The term was coined by Leigh; ibid. at 29. It was quoted
with approval in Dickson C.J.C.'s dissenting judgment in Dedman, supra note I I at 104. Leigh noted
that the police do not have all of those powers which might be thought necessary to the performance
of their duties. He indicated that "[h]istorically, there is no warrant for an ancillary powers doctrine
of this sort" (Leigh, ibid. at 29 [emphasis added]). In the second edition of his book, Leigh described
the Waterfield decision as "inconsistent with the ancillary powers doctrine" (supra note 7 at 36-37).
Dedman, supra note II at 121.

Ibid.
Ibid. at 122.
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unjustifiable use of a power associated with the police duty."76 Therefore, the majority
concluded that "there was common law authority for the random vehicle stop for the purpose
contemplated by the R.I.D.E. programme." 77
The Dedman majority's use of the two-part Waterfield test to create a new police power
was strongly criticized by Chief Justice Dickson in his dissenting opinion:
To find that arbitrary police action is justified simply because it is directed at the fulfilment of police duties
would be to sanction a dangerous exception to the supremacy of law. It is the function of the Legislature, not
the courts, to authorize arbitrary police action that would otherwise be unlawful as a violation of rights
traditionally protected at common law.
With respect, the majority of the court departs firm ground for a slippery slope when they authorize an
otherwise unlawful interference with individual liberty by the police, solely on the basis that it is reasonably
78
necessary to carry out general police duties.

As these comments reveal, at the heart of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent in Dedman are two fundamentally different visions of the appropriate division of
labour between the Supreme Court and Parliament. For the justices in dissent, the Court
overstepped its limited rights-protecting function by embracing the Waterfieldtest as a device
for transforming police action into police power based on the judicial application of a costbenefit analysis. They saw this approach as setting a dangerous precedent, by blurring the
important division between the functions of the legislative and the judicial branches of
government.79
After Dedman, the ancillary powers doctrine seemed to fade away for a period. In
subsequent decisions, the comments of some Supreme Court justices, as well as statements
concurred in by a majority of the Court, cast serious doubt on the continued validity of the
ancillary powers doctrine as a vehicle for creating police investigative powers in the Charter
era." However, the Ontario Court of Appeal's reliance upon the ancillary-powers doctrine
in Simpson made clear that its use as an expansive law-making device was not at an end.
C.

CREATING A NEW POLICE POWER

Before applying the ancillary powers doctrine, the Simpson Court explained its reasons
for taking action. Due to the low threshold for a "detention" under the Charter,the Court
indicated that it had

76

Ibid.

77

Ibid.
Ibid. at 106-107. See also Don Stuart, "R. v. Dedman: Annotation" (1985) 46 C.R. (3d) 193 at 195, who
argued that it would have been more appropriate for the Court to insist that lawful authority should
come from Parliament, at which point "the mandate of the Supreme Court would be to assess whether
such a scheme violated the ...
Charter."
See Kent Roach, "Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and
Canadian Legislatures" (2001) 80 Can. Bar. Rev. 481 at 515-17, for a general discussion of this larger
debate and Chief Justice Dickson's role in it.
For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 247-48 and 274, along with the accompanying text.

79

79

"

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION: A FAILED EXPERIMENT?

353

no doubt that the police detain individuals for investigative purposes when they have no basis to arrest them.
In some situations the police would be regarded as derelict in their duties if they did not do so. I agree with
Professor Young, "All Along the Watch Tower" ... at p. 367 when he asserts:
The courts must recognize the reality of investigatory detention and begin the process of
regulating the practice so that street detentions do not end up being non-stationhouse
incommunicado arrests.
Unless and until Parliament or the legislature acts, the common law and specifically the criteria formulated
in Waterfield ... must provide the means whereby the courts regulate the police power to detain for
8
investigatory purposes. 1

In the next part, we shall consider how effective Simpson and the cases it spawned have been
in regulating police detention practices. Before reaching that question, however, it is
necessary to consider how the Waterfield test was applied in Simpson to recognize an
investigative detention power.
In the Court's view, the first prong of the Waterfield test - whether the officer was acting
in the course of his duty - was easily satisfied on the facts of this case, given that the officer
was pursuing a criminal investigation when he stopped Simpson. 2 The Court then turned to
a consideration of the second prong of the test, whether the detention involved an
unjustifiable use of police powers associated with the duty: the cost-benefit analysis endorsed
in Dedman. Before proceeding to weigh the competing interests, the Court attempted to flesh
out this part of the test:
the justifiability of an officer's conduct depends on a number of factors including the duty being performed,
the extent to which some interference with individual liberty is necessitated in order to perform that duty, the
importance of the performance of that duty to the public good, the liberty interfered with, and the nature and
83
extent of the interference.

The Court then proceeded to frame the interests at stake. In this case, "'the fundamental
liberty' to move about in society without governmental interference" was at issue. 4 The
Court noted that the officer's purpose in stopping Simpson was not some service-related
police function. Rather, this stop involved a criminal investigation, "intended to bring the
force of the criminal justice process into operation against the appellant."" s These strong
pronouncements were immediately followed by an assertion that "where an individual is
detained by the police in the course of efforts to determine whether that individual is involved
in criminal activity being investigated by the police, detention can only be justified if the
t 6
detaining officer has some 'articulable cause' for the detention." 8

81
82

$3
94
85
86

Supra note I at 498, citing Young, supra note 11.
Ibid. The Court was of the view that the officer's effort to determine whether criminal activity was
occurring at the location and to substantiate police intelligence fell within the "wide duties placed on
police" to prevent crime and enforce criminal laws (ibid. at 499).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 500.
Ibid.; the Court indicated that "[d]ifferent criteria may well govern detentions which occur in a nonadversarial setting not involving the exercise of the police crime prevention function."
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In choosing this standard, the Simpson Court borrowed freely from the American Fourth
Amendment87 jurisprudence and, in particular, the "stop and frisk" cases." Prior to these
decisions, American case law had held that any interference with an individual's freedom of
movement, no matter how unobtrusive or brief, qualified as an arrest requiring probable
cause.8 9 This rule was eventually abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. In
Terry, the Court applied a balancing approach,' like that used in Dedman,to essentially hold
that the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to stop a person that he reasonably
suspects is engaged in criminal behaviour, and to frisk that person for a weapon, if the officer
9
also has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. '
Unfortunately, although the Simpson Court was cognizant of the American cases and the
standard that they had developed, it did not acknowledge the larger lessons of that
experience."
Rather, after embracing the "articulable cause" standard, the Simpson Court attempted to
define it. It instructed that this standard requires "a constellation of objectively discernible

:7

8

89

9'

92

U.S. Const. amend. IV [Fourth Amendment].
Supra note I at 500. TheCourt quoted from Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968) [Terry] and United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) [Cortez]. Later in the judgment, the Simpson Court provided additional
reasons for choosing this standard. First, it pointed to Wilson, supra note 45, a case in which the
Supreme Court found s. 119 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. H-7 authorized arbitrary
detentions contrary to s. 9 but was justified under s. I of the Charter. In Wilson, the Court held that the
stop, which was "lawful" in the sense that it was authorized by law, was not "arbitrary" despite the fact
that s. 119 authorized detentions on an arbitrary basis, given that on the facts the officer in that case
happened to have "articulable cause" (ibid. at 147). Second, it referred to R. v. Mack, [198812 S.C.R.
903, (1988), 44 C.C.C. (3d) 513, the leading entrapment decision, in which the Supreme Court held that
it was only constitutionally permissible for police to afford opportunities to commit offences to
individuals who they had "reasonable suspicion" to believe were already involved in criminal activity
(supra note I at 502-503).
See e.g. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 at 103 (1959), where the Court characterized the stopping
of a car as an "arrest" of the occupants requiring "reasonable cause to believe that a crime had been
committed."
After separating the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, which provides that "no Warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause" from what was termed the Amendment's "general proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures" (see Terry, supra note 88 at 20), the Court then quoted from its
earlier decision in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) and
explained that:
In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a general proposition, it
is necessary "first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen" for there is "no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against
the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails" (Terry, supra note 88 at 20-2 1).
It was in Camara and Terry that this balancing approach first gained a foothold in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See Scott E. Sundby, "A Return To Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing The Mischief
of Camara and Terry" (1988) 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, for a persuasive critique of this development.
The majority in Terry did not go quite this far, however. Its position was more tentative, holding only
that a police officer may conduct a frisk search where he reasonably believes that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the person whom he is investigating may be armed and dangerous (Terry, supra note
88 at 23-24, 27, 30). It was Justice Harlan's concurring opinion that fleshed out the stopping power
somewhat, noting that tojustify the frisk "the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on
an encounter, to make aforcible stop" (ibid. Harlan J., concurring at 32-33 [emphasis in original]). In
subsequent decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court came to read Terry as though it also authorized stops
based on reasonable suspicion. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, "Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect
Doctrine" (1998), 72 St. John's L. Rev. 911 at925-52, detailing how Terry's holding gradually evolved.
The lessons of the American experience under Terry are considered in some detail in Part IV.
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facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is
93
criminally implicated in the activity under investigation. The Court's reasons reveal great
optimism regarding the prophylactic benefits flowing from the adoption of an objective
standard, claiming that it
serves to avoid indiscriminate and discriminatory exercises of the police power. A "hunch" based entirely on
intuition gained by experience cannot suffice, no matter how accurate that "hunch" might prove to be. Such
subjectively based assessments can too easily mask discriminatory conduct based on such irrelevant factors
as the detainee's sex, colour, age, ethnic origin or sexual orientation. Equally, without objective criteria
detentions could be based on mere speculation. A guess which proves accurate becomes in hindsight a
94

"hunch".

The judgment assumes that the standard selected, in itself, will go a considerable distance
towards regulating the exercise of police discretion. Admittedly, formalizing a standard is a
good first step in structuring and confining police authority to conduct investigative stops.
Effective regulation, however, requires much more. 95 On the street, legal standards are only
one of many variables that will influence police behaviour. "[S]ignificant sociological
research" has demonstrated that police "do not consider these laws and then apply them to
the facts in the manner of a law student taking an exam"; the evidence suggests, rather, that
"police officers blend legal knowledge, 'common sense,' and various behavioral norms in
using such laws to deal with problems they are called upon to handle."96 Unfortunately,
Simpson does not acknowledge this larger truth about policing. Instead, it offers little more
than a legal standard against which to measure a police officer's decision to detain in those
comparatively rare cases where evidence is acquired, charges are laid, the decision to detain
is challenged and the basis for the stop is actually litigated.
There are other problems that flow from the standard selected by the Court. The judgment
proceeds with an exaggerated sense of both the ability of the police to recognize, and their
desire to respect, the difference between mere suspicion, articulable cause (that is, reasonable
suspicion), and reasonable and probable grounds. 97 The standard was no doubt selected by
the Court because it gives the police wide latitude in responding to the myriad of suspicious
situations that they confront in the field. Unfortunately, while the flexibility of this standard
is clearly its chief benefit it is also its main drawback. First, as a practical matter, the openended nature of the standard provides little meaningful direction to police. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has conceded,
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Supra note I at 502.
Ibid. at 501-502.
See Samuel Walker, "Historical Roots of the Legal Control of Police Behaviour" in Police Innovation
and Control, supra note 36, 32 at 47, noting that "rules are not self-enforcing. The mere existence of
a rule on a piece of paper somewhere means nothing.... Anyone knowledgeable about policing can
think of examples of the systematic evasion of a rule or rules."
Debra Livingston, "Gang Loitering, The Court, And Some Realism About Police Patrol," (1999) Sup.
Ct. Rev. 141 at 191. See also Mastrofski & Greene, supra note 36 at 84, noting "that police use the law
instrumentally, as a means to accomplish a variety of ends, and they therefore draw on it selectively,
applying it in ways that appear (legally) inconsistent."
See supra notes 14 through 35 and accompanying text.
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[c]ourts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize
police to stop a person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion" are not self-defining; they
fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad of factual situations that arise. But the essence
of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture - must be taken into
9

account.

8

Of course, simply telling the police to take the "totality of circumstances" into account, or
to make sure they possess a "constellation of objectively discernible facts," does little to
make up for the uncertainty inherent in the standard.
Even more troubling, however, is the possible effect that such an ambiguous standard can
have on the behaviour of some police officers. As Jerome Skolnick has warned,
whenever rules of constraint are ambiguous, they strengthen the very conduct they are intended to restrain.
Thus, the police officer already committed to a conception of law as an instrument of order rather than as an
end in itself is likely to utilize the ambiguity of the rules of restraint as a justification for testing or even
99
violating them.

Quite simply, the same officer who is inclined to stop unjustifiably is also likely to use
malleable legal standards like "articulable cause" or "reasonable suspicion" as a cloak. For
such an officer, the standard will serve as a pliable measurement against which to construct
reasons justifying those groundless stops that happen to yield evidence and which may need
to be defended in court as a result.'00
Putting the Simpson Court's optimistic view of the chosen standard to one side, it is
necessary to consider how it applied the second prong of the Waterfieldtest. Here, the Court
attempted to impose some limits on the power that it had just created: the existence of
articulable cause was considered "only the first step in the determination of whether the
detention wasjustified in the totality of the circumstances and consequently a lawful exercise
of the officer's common law powers."' ' The Court explained that,

98

'9

Im

'o

Cortez, supra note 88 at 417. Before adopting the "articulable cause" standard, the Simpson Court
quoted this passage (and others) from Cortez (supra note I at 501). See also Tracey Maclin, "The
Decline Of The Right Of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment On The Streets" (1990) 75 Cornell L.
Rev. 1258 at 1332-33, arguing that "[in an era of diluted probable cause, the Court should discard the
reasonable suspicion test.... there is no need for, and no way to meaningfully articulate and apply, an
intermediate standard between probable cause and arbitrariness"; Livingston, supra note 96 at 178,
noting that the stop-and-frisk standard "cannot be stated in clear and readily understandable language."
Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in DemocraticSociety, 3d ed. (New York:
Macmillan, 1994) at 12. See also Tracey Maclin, "Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black
Men And Police Discretion" (1998) 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1271 at 1320: "History teaches us that when
law enforcement personnel are given loosely supervised discretionary powers, police behavior will
reflect the biases and prejudices of individual officers. The police suspicion standard announced in
Terry facilitates abuse."
Providing standards with little else also plays into the hands of those critics who argue that arrest and
detention standards are intentionally elastic so that the exercise of police power can be justified after
the fact. Critics who claim, in effect, that due process is for crime control; see e.g. Doreen McBarnet,
"Arrest: The Legal Context of Policing," in Simon Holdaway, ed., The BritishPolice (London: Edward
Arnold, 1979) 24.
Supra note I at 503.
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[fqor
example, a reasonably based suspicion that a person committed some property-related offence at a distant
point in the past, while an articulable cause, would not, standing alone, justify the detention of that person on
a public street to question him or her about that offence. On the other hand, a reasonable suspicion that a
person had just committed a violent crime and was in flight from the scene of that crime could well justify
some detention of that individual in an effort to quickly confirm or refute the suspicion. Similarly, the
existence of an articulable cause that justified a brief detention, perhaps to ask the person detained for
identification, would not necessarily justify a more intrusive detention complete with physical restraint and
02
a more extensive interrogation.1

The above passage suggests that the investigative detention power is limited in a number
of different ways, depending on the nature of the crime suspected, the temporal connection
between the crime and the detention, the duration of the detention, and the intrusiveness of
the encounter. Unfortunately, while it alluded to these potential limitations, the Court
refrained from setting out any concrete rules or guidelines. Rather, it willingly embraced a
case-by-case approach, leaving the elucidation ofassociated powers and limitations regarding
this new police authority for another day. In doing so, the Court failed to recognize the
inherent incompatibility between the ex-postfacto approach it embraced and its laudable
regulatory aims. Absent a well-defined power, coupled with clearly stated limits, police
discretion is not meaningfully structured or confined. Similarly, given the low visibility of
street-level detentions, after-the-fact judicial review in that very small category of cases
where abuses yield evidence of criminality leaves the vast majority of unjustified street-level
detentions unchecked.
The Simpson Court proceeded to apply its newly-articulated power to the facts ofthe case.
The deficient tip, combined with Simpson's very fleeting connection to the suspect residence
foreclosed a finding ofarticulable cause, and hence, the detention could not bejustified under
the common law power created by the Court. Given the absence of any basis to suggest that
Constable Wilkins "erroneously believed on reasonable grounds that he had an articulable
cause" - a finding that the Court suggested might shield an unlawful detention from being
characterized as arbitrary - the detention was held to violate s. 9 of the Charter."3 The
analysis of the pocket search was straightforward: it, too, lacked lawful authority and was
therefore inconsistent with s. 8. "oAfter characterizing these violations as serious, the Court
proceeded to rule the cocaine inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter. Given that the
Crown had no further evidence, the Court allowed the appeal and substituted an acquittal.
The Simpson decision effectively vested police with an unprecedented power to detain
suspects in the field. At the same time, given the result, it essentially insulated this new
authority from immediate review by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Crown, no doubt
happywith its windfall - the judgment's recognition of an investigative detention powersensibly decided against an appeal. As a result, the unprecedented investigative detention

102
103

104

Ibid.
Ibid. at 504. For an explanation of why, under existingjurisprudence, an unlawful detention might still
not be characterized as arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, see supra notes 46 through 50 and
accompanying text.
See Collins v.The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) I at 14 [Collins cited to
C.C.C.], holding that lawful authority is a precondition for a "reasonable" search or seizure.
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power had an opportunity to take root and, in time, it has developed a virtually national
following.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not yet directly endorsed it.'o 6
Before moving on to consider the practical difficulties flowing from Simpson and the
power it created, it is helpful to reiterate the major lessons from this Part. First, the
investigative detention power was built on a questionable foundation, given that existing case
law seemed to clearly foreclose it."0 7 In addition, closer scrutiny reveals that the ancillary
powers doctrine, upon which the creation of this new police power depends, seems neither
well-conceived nor well-established. Second, on a practical level, Simpson did little more
than create an investigative detention power and articulate a standard for its use. For a
decision ostensibly driven by a desire to "regulate" police detention practices, the judgment
provides little concrete guidance. Unfortunately, as the next Part illustrates, subsequent
decisions have not managed to do much better.
IV. REGULATION OR LEGITIMIZATION

The decision in Simpson served to legalize police investigative detentions based on
articulable cause. As explained earlier, such stops are an inevitable and even essential part
of police practice, whether or not they are lawful. Making these practices legal could no
doubt play an important role in finally regulating them.0 8 Effective regulation, however, will
require much more. Unfortunately, the cases following Simpson have done little to clarify the
limits ofthe investigative detention power. The result has been more questions, few answers,
and greater confusion, often accompanied by an incremental expansion of police power." °
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See supra note 3 for a list of those provincial appellate courts that have followed Simpson.
See R. v. Jacques, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312, (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) I at II [Jacques cited to C.CC.],
relying on Simpson's definition of "reasonable suspicion" to interpret s. 99()(f) of the Customs Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), which authorizes searches based on what was considered to be
essentially the same standard, where an officer "suspects on reasonable grounds"; R. v. Godoy, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 311, (1999), 131 C.C.C. (3d) 129 at 137 [Godoy cited to C.C.C.], endorsing Simpson's
formulation of the second prong of the Waterfield test (see supra note 83 and accompanying text) but
without expressly commenting on the investigative detention power. See also R. v. Asante-Mensah,
2003 SCC 38 at para. 75 [Asante-Mensah], pointing to Simpson's formulation of the second prong of
the Waterfield test as supplying a "broad range of factors" to be considered in assessing "[jiustication
in the criminal law" generally, while similarly failing to address the investigative detention power. But
see R. v. Latimer, [1997] I S.C.R. 217, (1997), 112 C.C.C.(3d) 19 3 at 203 [Latimer cited to C.C.C.],
where the Court held that an individual suspected of murder who was told that he was "being detained
for investigation" was in fact placed under defacto arrest - requiring reasonable and probable grounds
and thereby avoiding a characterization of the encounter as an investigative detention.
See supra notes 9 through 13 and accompanying text. See also Steve Coughlan, "Search Based On
Articulable Cause: Proceed With Caution Or Full Stop?" (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49 at 51-57, noting how
the existence of such an investigative detention power seems inconsistent with and foreclosed by a
number of Supreme Court decisions.
See Davis, DiscretionaryJustice, supra note 6 at 12, noting that lawmakers sometimes acquiesce in
or even encourage illegal official action, whereas "the proper course may be to make legal the illegal
official practices that have long been a part of our system."
See Lesley A. McCoy, "Liberty's Last Stand? Tracing The Limits Of Investigative Detention" (2002)
46 Crim. L.Q. 319 at 320, arguing that the decisions following Simpson "have been less rigorous inthe
application of investigative detention such that the principle has been expanded beyond its original
design."
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In considering Simpson's legacy over the last decade, and in attempting to forecast what
the future might bring, it is helpful to look to the United States. Although Canadian
developments do not exactly parallel those south of the border, in the short period since
Simpson was decided some clear similarities are already apparent. This suggests that the
American stop-and-frisk cases subsequent to Terry provide the best insight into what the
future will likely hold for Canadian law, should the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately
choose to endorse a judicially-created investigative detention power.
A.

USE OF FORCE

The use of force to effect an investigative detention creates the first challenge. Although
Simpson gave police the "power" to conduct investigative detentions, it did not address the
amount of force that can be used if an individual does not acquiesce to police authority. In
what has become a familiar pattern, none of the appellate court decisions following Simpson
has effectively filled this gap.
To date, the decisions have provided only minimal guidance on the amount of force police
are permitted to use in effecting investigative stops. In one case, the Ontario Court of Appeal
held that if an individual for whom a police officer possesses articulable cause to detain does
not "submit to lawful detention," then the officer is entitled to "pursue him" and, when
caught, to "physically restrain" him."' In another case, the Alberta Court of Appeal
suggested that an articulable cause detention entitled a police officer to kick a suspect who
was discovered hiding underneath a car after he refused to come out when directed."'
Finally, the drawing and pointing of firearms, as well as the handcuffing of suspects, has met
with the approval of the courts of appeal in both British Columbia" 2 and Alberta." 3 None of
these cases establish clear guidelines for police regarding the amount of force that can be
used in carrying out future investigative stops.
In the United States, police powers associated with the authority to conduct Terry stops
have been fleshed out on the same case-by-case basis for over thirty-five years. If this
approach is maintained in Canada, there is little reason to think that the rules generated here
will not eventually be to the same effect. In time, with respect to the degree of force
permissible in carrying out investigative stops, this approach will inevitably lead, as it has
in the United States, "to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in
police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of force more traditionally

110 R. v. Wainwright (1999), 68 C.R.R. (2d) 29 at 30 (Ont. C.A.).
See R. v. Yum (2001), 277 A.R. 238 (C.A.) [Yum]. The police officer was charged with assault but
acquitted because the Court concluded that he had articulable cause to detain "the suspect and to
employ the force that he did" (ibid. at para. 7).
1'
See Ferris,supra note 3, in which the Court did not comment on either the drawing of handguns or the
use of handcuffs. See also R. v. Lal (1998), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 413 (B.C.C.A.) [Lal], where control over
the suspect (whom the officer had good reason to believe armed) was secured at gunpoint - a matter
about which the Court made no comment.
"'
See Dupuis, supra note 3 at para. 7, where the drawing of handguns and the use of handcuffs was
characterized by the Court as "not an unreasonable exercise of force" in a case where the police detained
a room full of people in search of a drug seller.
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associated with arrest than with investigatory detention."" 4 And while lower courts have
incrementally expanded police power, limits on the amount or nature of permissible force
remain far from clear. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has still not addressed whether
potentially fatal force can ever be used to effect a Terry stop.
In contrast, s. 25(l) of the Criminal Code authorizes a police officer to "use as much force
as is necessary" in carrying out an arrest, while subsections (3) and (4) go on to carefully
limit the circumstances in which force that is intended to cause grievous bodily harm or death
can be used. Although it has been suggested that s. 25 might apply to investigative
detentions,"' subsection (1) only licenses the use of force by a police officer who "acts on
reasonable grounds" - the more onerous standard historically associated with conventional
arrests."' 6 Therefore, absent legislative intervention, the force that can be used to effect an
investigative stop will continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis. This approach
tends to legitimize the force actually used by police, while rarely supplying guidance about
the outer limits of police authority.
B.

INCIDENTAL SEARCHES

The existence and scope of a search power, incidental to the authority to conduct an
investigative detention, is also far from settled. The Simpson Court did not suggest that the
power it was creating would carry with it the authority to search those subject to an
investigative detention. Although the Court relied on Terry - the source of the "stop and
frisk" power in the United States - it did so only for the "articulable cause" standard
governing stops." 8 In effect, Simpson transplanted to Canada the "stop" power from
American jurisprudence without incorporating the authority to "frisk."

"1

11

116

"1

11

UnitedStatesv. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221 at 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1994) [Tilmon], observing this trend in the
Terry stop-and-frisk jurisprudence. See also United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1993);
UnitedStatesv. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1993), each holding that handcuffing is permissible
during a Terry stop when police have reason to believe a suspect might be armed or dangerous. See also
UnitedStates v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1992), holding that handcuffing is permissible where
the suspect is caught after a chase. But see Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1992), holding that
handcuffing during Terry stops is not permitted as a matter of routine. See also United States v.
Rodriguez, 831 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1987), holding that it is permissible to require a suspect to sit in a
police cruiser for a few minutes during a Terry stop. But see UnitedStates v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337
(9th Cir. 1990), holding that placing a suspect in a police car, absent some basis for concern regarding
officer safety or security, transformed the encounter into an arrest requiring probable cause. See also
UnitedStatesv. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), holding that it is permissible for police to draw weapons
if there is reason to believe a suspect is armed and dangerous.
See Coughlan, supra note 107 at 55-56, who refers to Yum, supra note 11, and undoubtedly came to
this conclusion based on the fact that the police officer in that case was acquitted of assault- although
the judgment does not mention s. 25 of the Code.
See R. v. Smellie (1994), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 9 at 17 (B.C.C.A.), in which the Court held that "reasonable
grounds" essentially equates to reasonable and probable grounds; leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused,
(1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) vi.
Supra note I at 505-506: given that the Court concluded that there was no articulable cause to justify
the stop, it was unnecessary to address whether- had the stop been lawful - the search of the pocket
would have been permissible.
Ibid. at 500-501.
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A decade later, almost half of the appellate courts that have embraced the investigative
detention power have still not conclusively addressed whether it carries with it a concurrent
search power." 9 In these provinces, police officers have been granted the authority to come
into close proximity with potentially dangerous suspects without being afforded any guidance
on the measures they can lawfully take to ensure their safety. This does not mean that police
officers in these provinces are not searching detainees. Rather, as those who have studied
police behaviour report, "when police are not provided with explicit authority to deal
effectively with the problems they encounter ... they often unwittingly become dirty workers,
furtively 'doing what has to be done' through the exercise of their discretion."' 20 This is
troubling because it means that the chance to limit overly intrusive searches, those that
exceed what is necessary to ensure the safety of police officers, is lost.
This is not to suggest that the solution lies in courts recognizing an incidental search
power. Judicial efforts aimed at addressing this problem can have their own unfortunate sideeffects. The case-by-case explication of an incidental search power will lead to an
incremental expansion of police authority to a point that far exceeds what is needed for police
safety -the original rationale for recognizing such a power. This negative byproduct of a
judicially created search power is best illustrated by the experience in both the United States
and those Canadian provinces where courts have already endorsed an incidental search
power.
In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the power to "stop and frisk" suspects
based on articulable cause represented a significant departure from the probable cause long
demanded by its prior Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. 2 ' Injustifying this deviation from
established constitutional standards, the Court emphasized the limited nature of the
permissible search. The "sole justification" for a search "is the protection of the police officer
and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the
police officer."' 22 Searches were not meant to be an automatic part of every stop. Rather, they
were to be limited to those situations that cause an officer "reasonably to conclude ...
that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous."' 23 In addition,
even where an officer has legitimate safety concerns, the "search" had to be restricted to a
"frisk" - a "carefully limited search of the outer clothing" worn by a suspect. 124 During this
initial search, if police officers detect something that has the potential to be a weapon, they
2
are entitled to reach inside a pocket or beneath clothing to retrieve it.' 1

119

120
121
122
123
124

125

As explained below, only five of the nine provincial appellate courts that have endorsed the
investigative detention power have also recognized an incidental search power: British Columbia,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec.
George L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing
Crime in Our Communities (New York: Free Press, 1996) at 167.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
Terry, supra note 88 at 29.
Ibid. at 30.
Ibid.
The Court held that the search here was reasonable because the officer began by patting down outer
clothing and "did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until
he had felt the weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns" (ibid.). See also Sibron
v.New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) [Sibron]. Sibron was a companion case to Terry. In Sibron the officer
had "thrust his hand" into the suspect's pocket. The Court noted that its decision in Terry only approved
"a limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used as
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In the thirty-five years since Terry was decided, however, many of the limits it carefully
imposed on the search power it created have gradually been eroded. The pliability of the
police-safety rationale has figured prominently in these developments. First, "[lower courts
have consistently expanded the types ofoffenses always considered violent regardless of the
individual circumstances."' 26 Similarly, they have also come to accept that "certain types of
persons and situations always pose a danger of armed violence to police."' 27 As a result,
"[w]hen confronted with these offenses, persons, or situations, police may automatically
frisk, whether or not any individualized circumstances point to danger."' 28 In effect, searches
have become a much more common feature of stops, making the "stop and frisk" label apt.
Since Terry was decided, the scope of searches carried out incidental to investigative
detentions has also grown. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has maintained that the
accompanying personal search must be limited to no more than a "frisk" for weapons, 29
' more
intrusive probing for evidence or contraband is still easily justified. For instance, given the
risk that any hard object may potentially be a weapon, a search inside pockets or beneath
clothing is quite often defensible. 30
The police safety rationale has also been used to extend the scope of potential searches
well beyond the person of the detainee. American courts commonly uphold searches inside
the purses, briefcases, knapsacks and duffle bags carried by individuals subject to a Terry

126

127

128

129

130

instruments of assault," and held the search in this case unconstitutional because it "was not reasonably
limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its
inception - the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man" (ibid. at 65).
David A. Harris, "Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry" (1994) 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. I at
5 [emphasis in original]. For example, a stop based on reasonable suspicion of drug possession (see
United States v. Alexander, 907 F,2d 269 (2d Cir. 1990)) or drug trafficking (see United States v.
Sinclair,983 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.Salazar,945 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1989), UnitedStates v. Gilliard,847 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1988);
United States v. Nersesian,824 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Pajari,715 F.2d 1378 (8th
Cit. 1983) automatically entitles police to frisk because of ajudicial presumption that the drug trade
is inherently dangerous.
Harris, ibid. [emphasis in original]. For example, a person who is in the company of someone who is
arrested is subject to a similar presumption and can automatically be frisk searched. See United States
v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823 (8th Cir.
1986).
Harris, ibid. See also David A. Harris, "Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme
Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio" (1998) 72 St. John's L. Rev. 975 at
1001-1012 ["Particularized Suspicion"].
See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). In Dickerson, the officer felt a small lump in the
suspect's pocket during the pat-down, and after manipulating it further between his fingers, the officer
concluded it was crack cocaine and removed it from the pocket. The Court concluded that the further
examination of the lump, after the officer realized it was not a weapon, exceeded "the bounds of the
'strictly circumscribed' search for weapons allowed under Terry" (ibid. at 378).
See UnitedStates v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 1998), where a search inside a sock containing five
credit cards was upheld; United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1993), where a search of a
pocket containing a metal money clip full of money was upheld; State v. Morrow, 603 A.2d 835 (Del.
1992), where a search of a pocket containing tightly packed bags of crack cocaine was upheld; State
v. Betterman, 232 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 1975), where a search of a pocket containing a prescription bottle
was upheld.
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stop.' 3' Those stopped while travelling in a car fare even worse. As a matter of routine, the
police are entitled to order the driver and any passenger(s) out of the car.' In addition, a
concern that weapons may be contained inside the vehicle entitles police to conduct a
protective search of the "passenger compartment ... limited to those areas in which a weapon
may be placed or hidden."' 3 3 This can include searching the glove compartment13 and any
3
bags or other containers found inside the vehicle. 1
Not surprisingly, given the influence of the American case law, it took very little time for
many of those Canadian appellate courts that followed Simpson to begin grafting a search
power onto the authority to conduct an investigative detention. 36 In some provinces, an
automatic and intrusive search power was recognized from the outset by reference to those
principles that govern the power to search incidental to an arrest.'37 For example, in a case
involving an articulable cause detention, in addition to searching for protective purposes, the
Quebec Court of Appeal held that the police are entitled to search "to secure evidence of a
crime."'3 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal likewise blurred any distinction between

13

12

13

13

15

"i'

17

'

See United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1992), where a search of a purse was upheld.
State v. Ortiz, 683 P2d 822 (Haw. 1984), where a search of a knapsack was upheld; United States v.
McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ), where a search of a briefcase was upheld; United States
v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1980), where a search of a duffle bag was upheld.
See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), granting this power in relation to drivers who are
stopped for routine traffic violations; Marylandv. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), extending this power
to include passengers. See also United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Patterson, 648 F2d 625 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which
make clear that Mimms - and by implication Wilson - apply equally to Terry stops.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), authorizing protective vehicle searches incidental to a
Terry stop.
See United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1992), where police were entitled to unlock a
glove compartment and look inside, given that the driver and the passengers were inside with keys;
United States v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1990), holding that the police were entitled to unlock
and search the glove compartment even though all three suspects were outside of the car at the time.
See United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987), holding that it was permissible for
police to look inside a bag found inside the car; United States v. Longmire, 761 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.
1985), holding that it was permissible for police to search inside a purse located within a car.
In some cases the existence ofsuch a power was largely assumed. See R. v. Waniandy (1995), 162 A.R.
293 (C.A.) [Waniandy]; Lake. supra note 3; R. v. McAuley (1998), 124 C.C.C. (3d) 117 (Man. C.A.)
[McAuley]. In others, such a power was only recognized after an application ofthe two prong Waterfield
ancillary powers test. See Mann, supra note 5; although the Court cited its earlier decision in McAuley,
it did not rely on it as providing authority for a search. See also Ferris, supra note 3.
For a discussion ofthe power to search incident to arrest, see Cloutierv. Langlois, [1990] I S.C.R. 158,
(1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 257 at 274 [Cloutier cited to C.C.C.], affirming that "the common law as
recognized and developed in Canada holds that the police have a power to search a lawfully arrested
person and to seize anything in his or her possession or immediate surroundings to guarantee the safety
of the police and the accused, prevent the prisoner's escape or provide evidence against him"; R. v.
Caslake, [1998] I S.C.R. 51, (1997), 121 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 107 [Caslake cited to C.C.C.], making clear
that a search incidental to arrest can extend to an arrestee's vehicle; R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C R. 679,
(2001), 159 C.C.C. (3d) 449 [Golden], limiting the authority to conduct strip searches incidental to an
arrest to situations where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that such an intrusive
search is necessary to secure a weapon orevidence, and requiring that such searches only be undertaken
at the station house absent exigent circumstances.
R. v. Murray (1997), 136 C.C.C. (3d) 197 at 212 (Que. C.A.). In Murray, the police had set up a
roadblock along a likely escape route for three armed robbery suspects. After stopping the appellant,
the officer saw what appeared to be a panel in the cargo area and was concerned that the two other
suspects might be hiding beneath it. A search revealed that the panel was actually a tarp under which
the officer discovered clearly-marked contraband cigarettes. Arguably, given the potential presence of
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investigative detentions and conventional arrests. That Court upheld a pocket search of a
detained suspect before he was placed in a police cruiser. 39 In doing so, the Court explicitly
noted that "[flor the purposes of this case there is no difference between the police power to
40
search attendant upon an arrest and that incident to detention."'
Although the British Columbia Court of Appeal did not set out to license searches for
contraband and evidence incidental to investigative stops, this has been the effect of its
judgments. In the Court's first decision following Simpson, the Waterfield test was applied
to authorize police "if they are justified in believing that the person stopped is carrying a
weapon, to search for weapons as an incident to detention."' 4' In coming to this conclusion,
the Court quoted those passages from Terry that emphasized the need to give police officers
the power to protect their safety when in close contact with suspected criminals. Those
excerpts that stressed the importance of limiting the incidental search to no more than a
"frisk" or a "pat-down" were not reproduced.' 42 Instead, the Court placed only the loosest of
limits on the potential scope of the searches it authorized:
The seriousness of the circumstances which led to the stop will govern the decision whether to search atall,
and if so, the scope of the search that is undertaken. As Chief Justice Warren put it in Terry (at p. 905), the
search must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place". Questioning an elderly shopper about a suspected shoplifting would not ordinarily require a search for
weapons; questioning someone after a bank robbery might require a search of the detainee and his or her
immediate surroundings.143

In the course of upholding the search at issue in that case,' 44 the Court avoided imposing any
concrete limits on the scope of potential searches. Rather, it deferred to police discretion,
refusing to "require them to determine with precision the least intrusive manner of securing
45
their safety."'1
Subsequent judgments of the British Columbia Court of Appeal have built upon the
Court's early holding that the "seriousness of the circumstances" might permit "a search of

1'9

140
'4'
42

143

144

145

two armed suspects, a protective search power would have been enough to uphold the officer's cursory
examination of the cargo area in this case.
Lake, supra note 3 at 209. In Lake, the officer admitted that he routinely searched those detained, not
only for safety sake, but to ensure that they "don't ... 'have anything on their person that's illegal';
ibid. Although the Court concluded that the officer had grounds to arrest the accused for impaired
driving, it unfortunately did not emphasize this fact in its reasons. Rather, the Court wrote generally
about the authority to search "a lawfully detained person" and specifically cited Simpson, ibid.at 211.

Lake, ibid at 211-12.

Ferris,supra note 3 at 314.
Ibid at 312-14. For a description of the limits Terry attempted to impose, see supra notes 121 to 125
and accompanying text.
Ferris,supra note 3 at 314-15 [emphasis added].
In Ferris, the suspect had been a passenger in a car that was stopped because police reasonably
suspected it might be stolen. After the suspect's hands were cuffed behind her back, the detaining
officer searched inside the waistpack she was wearing for identification and weapons and instead found
cocaine. Following the deferential approach it endorsed, the Court rejected an argument that police
safety would have been adequately served by taking the pack away from the suspect during the stop.
Ibid. at 303-305.

Ibid at 299.
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the detainee and his or her immediate surroundings."' 46 In addition to upholding searches
inside "waist packs"' 47 and "fanny packs"' 48 worn by suspects, the Court has relied upon this
broad power to permit police to explore the contents of a bag a suspect was carrying when
stopped.'49 The Court has also upheld vehicle searches incidental to investigative stops. In
one case, it upheld the search of a closed bag found inside a vehicle 5 ° and in another case,
it upheld the opening of a glove compartment and examination of its contents. 5' Although
the Court has indicated that in contrast to searches incidental to arrest, "investigative
detention does not provide a foundation for a search for contraband,"' 52 it has ignored the fact
that the intrusive searches it has authorized essentially look identical to those that accompany
conventional arrests.' In fact, given the permissible scope of a search, a police officer can
quite easily search for contraband and/or evidence incidental to an investigative stop and be
assured that the search will be upheld on review as long as officer safety is offered to justify
54
it.1

Ibid, at 315.
Ibid.
148
See La!, supra note 112. In Lal, the officer began his search by unbuckling the fanny pack worn by the
suspect, which then fell to the ground "as if there was a brick in it" (ibid. at para. 12). A search of its
contents revealed a loaded semi-automatic pistol.
'49
See R. v. Yamanaka (1998), 128 C.C.C. (3d) 570 (B.C.C.A.) [Yamanaka]. In Yamanaka, the police had
been responding to a complaint of gunfire in the vicinity. An officer became concerned that an athletic
bag one of the suspect's was holding close might contain weapons, so he searched it.
The Court upheld
the search which revealed instruments for breaking into vending machines.
"5
See R.v. Cooke (2002), 2 CR. (6th) 35 (B.C.C.A.). Alter stopping the suspects, the police searched
their vehicle. Inside, they located a bag which, once opened, was found to contain cash and coins. The
money was counted and it matched the amount taken in a recent robbery. The suspects were arrested.
Any protective motivation for this search was clearly exhausted by the point the police began counting
the money. According to the Court, the articulable cause justifying the stop "fully justified the police
...
conducting a search on the spot" (ibid. at para. 17).
151
See R. v. Hyatt (2002), 171 C.C.C. (3d) 409 (B.C.C.A.) [Hyatt]. In Hyatt, the search revealed coins and
cigarettes which served to link the suspects to a recently committed robbery, resulting in their arrest.
The trial judge concluded that the appellants, as passengers in the vehicle, lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge this search. The Court refused to
interfere with this conclusion (ibid. at para. 41). As a result, the Court did not assess the propriety of
the search or clarify whether its motivation was police safety or evidence gathering.
152
R. v. Le (2001), 160 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (B.C.C.A.). In Le, the Court also indicated that "to conflate the
kind of necessitous search undertaken on an investigative detention with a search incident to a lawful
arrest would run counter to a good deal of well-established s. 8 Charterjurisprudence" (ibid. at para.
13).
,53 See supra note 137, explaining the search incidental to arrest power with supporting cases.
154
See R. v. Johnson (2000), 32 C.R. (5th) 236 (B.C.C.A.). In Johnson, the Court held that the police
exceeded their authority to search incidental to a lawful investigative detention when they looked inside
two pillow-cases carried by a suspect. The Court noted that "[nieither police officer testified that the
search was for anything other than contraband. They did not give evidence that the search was necessary
for their safety. The search, in my view, was therefore unreasonable" (ibid at para. 12). The clear
implication is that had such evidence been offered, the search would likely have been justified. A good
example of this is the Court's recent decision in R. v. Hunt, 2003 BCCA 434. In Hunt, the police
detained a suspect in the course of investigating a bank robbery. The police had information that the
assailant was armed and pointed to this in explaining why the suspect had been searched. The search
yielded 30 $100 bills secreted in the suspect's sock and in other parts of his clothing. The suspect was
not carrying a weapon. In upholding this search, the Court emphasized the legitimate safety concerns
expressed by police. Lost in this analysis is the fact that a mere frisk search would have quickly
confirmed that the suspect was unarmed. Instead, a concern about weapons was enough to justify an
unnecessarily intrusive search into the suspect's socks and beneath the outer surfaces of his clothing:
a search that ultimately revealed evidence, not weapons.
146
'47
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The experience in Alberta has been to the same effect, although by a less direct path. At
least in principle, the Court of Appeal has recognized the importance of limiting an incidental
search power. The Court has held that where a police officer is concerned that a suspect
might be carrying a weapon, a "pat search" is permissible. In that judgment, however, the
Court went on to conclude that probing into the suspect's pockets was justified because a
"bulky leather jacket provided the special reason for the more intrusive search."' 55 Of course,
heavy garments are commonplace in Alberta during much of the year. The same is true
throughout most of Canada. 56
' On a practical level, this makes pocket searches the rule rather
than the exception. More recently, the Alberta Court of Appeal again reiterated the police
safety rationale in concluding that it was permissible for police to search inside the handbags
carried by two suspects subject to an investigative stop.'57 In no time at all, what began as a
limited power to conduct a "pat-search" for weapons has mushroomed into the authority to
search inside a suspect's pockets and any bags they may be carrying.
In Manitoba, an expansive search power has also been recognized, albeit by a more
curious route. The Manitoba Court of Appeal first dealt with the existence of an incidental
search power in a case involving a suspect who was detained after arriving at a location
where police were in the process of executing a search warrant. ' After emphasizing the need
to ensure the safety of police officers executing warrants and citing decisions from provinces
where an incidental search power had already been accepted,' 59 the Court agreed with the
Crown's submission that a "limited search" was permissible on the facts. 6 ° The Court
therefore upheld what it characterized as a "frisk" search carried out by police. 6 ' On closer
scrutiny, however, the incriminating evidence revealed by this search consisted of "a
cigarette, which was found to be marihuana, two sets of keys, and a paper sketch."' 62 Given
that none of these items could possibly be mistaken for a weapon, and given that the
suspect's pockets had to have been emptied and the contents closely examined, the police
action upheld in this case represented much more than a limited "frisk" search.
In its next decision - the case that will finally place the status of investigative stops and
any incidental search power before the Supreme Court of Canada- the Manitoba Court of
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Waniandy, supra note 136 at para. 4.
See Coughlan, supra note 107 (making this same point and noting that it serves to make s. 8 a "fair
weather right" at 65).
R. v. TA. V (2001), 48 C.R. (5th) 366 (Alta. C.A.) [TA. V.]. In TA. V., the police claimed they had
reasonable suspicion to stop the suspects and search their handbags for weapons on the basis of two
intercepted telephone conversations. One telephone call reported that the two suspects would be
travelling to Edmonton from Vancouver by bus. During the second call, when one of the callers was
asked about the reason for the trip, the other responded: "Bang, bang, we're dead, 50 bullets in your
head, one red, one blue, they are full of chicken poo" (ibid. at para. 2). The Court readily accepted that
this nonsensical rhyme provided reasonable suspicion not only to stop the suspects, but to search for
weapons inside the bags they were carrying.
See McAuley, supra note 136.
Ibid. at paras. 22-40.
Ibid. at para. 39.
Ibid. at para. 12.
Ibid. One of the keys, when tested, opened the front and back doors at the location, which was being
used to grow a large quantity of marihuana. Another set opened a safe at the location which contained
a number of additional pieces of very incriminating evidence, while the sketch was a diagram of a
ventilation system similar to that being used at the location that was searched.
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Appeal expressly embraced a rather expansive search power. In Mann,' 6 3 the accused had
been stopped by police because he matched the description of a suspect in a nearby break-in.
The stop was accompanied by what the officer described as a "pat-down ... security search"
for weapons. During this initial search, the officer felt something that he conceded "was not
hard" in the kangaroo-style pouch of the suspect's sweater. The officer then searched inside
the pouch and removed a plastic bag containing almost an ounce of marihuana and some
baggies. The officer explained his exploration of the pouch by noting his concern that a
weapon could have been concealed behind the soft item he had initially felt."6
The Court did not rely upon its earlier decision to provide authority for this search.
Instead, after applying the Waterfield test, the Court concluded that the police not only had
the authority to detain in these circumstances, but also had the power to carry out a pat-down
(or frisk) "limited to a search for weapons."' 65 After recognizing this power, however, the
Mann Court proceeded to grant police considerable discretion in deciding when to conduct
a more intrusive search:
as we are taking about a search undertaken for safety reasons, it would not be reasonable to place too rigid a
restraint on a police officer's right to ensure that the detainee has no weapon or other object with which he
might cause harm to the police, himself or members of the public. It is therefore my opinion that, so long as
the court is satisfied that the search for weapons was conducted in good faith - and not as an excuse to search
the detainee for evidence of a crime - the officer should be allowed some latitude. In the present case, the
officer's explanation of why he searched inside the pouch ...
strikes me as a reasonable ground for extending
the pat-down search to a search inside the pouch. There iscertainly nothing to suggest that the officer was not
166
acting in good faith in this regard.

Under this deferential approach, a police officer's plausible safety concerns are a sufficient
basis forjustifying a more probing search than a "pat-down." As a practical matter, given that
"anything hard in the accused's pocket could be a weapon, and anything soft could be
covering something hard,"'' 67 the decision, if it ultimately stands, would serve to make
intrusive personal searches a routine part of most investigative stops.
After the Supreme Court granted leave in Mann, the Manitoba Court of Appeal appeared
to have second-thoughts about the considerable leeway it had given police in determining the
potential scope of incidental searches. In another judgment,'68after reiterating much of its
earlier holding in Mann, the Court attempted to clarify the circumstances in which a more
intrusive protective search than a "pat-down" or "frisk" is permitted. Before proceeding
further, an officer must subjectively believe that a more probing search is necessary for safety
reasons. 69 In addition, the Court supplemented its holding in Mann with an objective test:
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Supra note 5.
Ibid. at paras. 2-5.
Ibid. at para. 26.
Ibid. at para. 37.
Steve Coughlan, "R. v. Mann: Annotation" (2003) 5 C.R. (6th) 306 at 307.
R. v. Willis, (2003), 174 C.C.C. (3d) 406, 2003 MBCA 54 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. requested.
Ibid. at paras. 33-38.
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there must be evidence to support the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that a search was necessary
for officer safety. The officer should be able to specify the particular facts on which the belief is based, and
a prudent individual in those circumstances must be able to come to the conclusion that a search is reasonably
0
necessary for safety reasons. 17

In Willis, the suspicious circumstances surrounding the stop, the fact that one of the
officers had prior (apparently violent) dealings with the suspect, together with a bulge that
the suspect had attempted to hide, combined to provide "objectively justifiable reasons to
substantiate officer safety concerns."'' Consequently, it was permissible for police to
automatically probe beneath the outer surfaces of the suspect's clothing. Under this approach,
the Court was not required to address how the papers and bills that were discovered could
be mistaken for a weapon during the initial pat-down. Rather, a more probing search is
always justified where a police officer has objectivelyjustifiable safety concerns. The search
in Willis easily satisfied this requirement and was therefore considered reasonable under s.
8 of the Charter.'72
A common thread can be found in the reasoning of those Canadian courts that have
recognized a power to search incidental to an investigative detention. In each case, it is not
unusual for the suspect's s. 8 Charterright - "to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure' ' 73 - to get lost in the shuffle to uphold a "police officer's right to ensure that the
detainee has no weapon."' 74 To date, despite claims to the contrary, no court has managed
to convincingly reconcile a search power premised upon articulable cause with the
7
established s. 8 jurisprudence. 1
The requirements of s. 8 of the Charterare easily explained by reference to two decisions
of the Supreme Court, beginning with Hunter v. Southam'76 In Hunter, the Supreme Court
set out three basic requirements for assessing whether a law that authorizes a search or
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Ibid. at para. 37.
Ibid. at para. 38.
Ibid.
Supra note 40, s. 8.
Mann, supra note 5 at para. 37 [emphasis added]. See Peter Sankoff, "Articulable Cause Based
Searches Incident to Detention - This Cooke May Spoil the Broth" (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 41 at 47,
noting that in these cases it often seems that "officer safety is utilized as a generalizedjustification to
conduct a comprehensive search ... the 'risk' is deemed tojustify a general need for privacy interests
to give way to a search" [emphasis in original].
The appellate courts in Quebec, Saskatchewan and Alberta created the search power without expressly
addressing the requirements for reasonable searches or seizures under s. 8 of the Charter.In Ferris,the
British Columbia Court of Appeal under the heading "Is the Power to Search Incident to an
Investigative Detention a Reasonable Law?" dealt with the question by simply indicating that it "was
not an issue on this appeal. Having found that an investigative detention and a search incidental to that
investigation meets the test of reasonable necessity, it cannot be said that the common law power is
unreasonable" (Ferris,supra note 3 at para. 61). In the quoted passage, the Court is referring to the
ancillary powers doctrine from Dedman, indicating that if a search power emerges from the application
of the Waterfield test, then by necessity it must be reasonable under s. 8. A fitting metaphor for this
approach is that the ancillary powers tail can wag the constitutional dog! See also Mann, supra note 5
at para. 31, citing this passage from Ferrisas confirmation that the search power accords with s. 8.
[1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 [Hunter cited to C.CC.].
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seizure is "reasonable" under s. 8.171Most importantly, for our purposes, searches or seizures
may only be permitted where there are reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been
committed and that evidence will be found in the place to be searched."' This standard
applies equally to warrantless search powers. 7 '
Hunter was followed by Collins,' which supplied a general framework for assessing
reasonableness. In Collins, the Court held that to be "reasonable,"a search must be authorized
by law, the law itself must be reasonable, and the search must be carried out in a reasonable
manner.'' Later cases made clear that Hunter's safeguards only apply to criminal or quasicriminal search powers. Less rigorous protections are required for search powers in other
contexts. 82
' In circumstances where the state's interest is criminal law enforcement, however,
the Supreme Court has usually insisted upon strict observance of Hunter's requirements,
given the individual liberty and privacy interests at stake. 83
In the criminal investigative context, the Supreme Court has only upheld deviations from
Hunter's standards once, with respect to searches incident to arrest.8 4 This longstanding
common law search power, as developed in Canada, was found to be consistent with the
requirements of s. 8, even though it permits searches in cases where a police officer may lack
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They are: (1) a warrant is necessary to search whenever it is feasible to obtain one - warrantless
searches are presumed to be unreasonable and must bejustified by the state; (2) warrants should only
be issued when there are reasonable and probable grounds, established under oath, that an offence has
been committed and that evidence will be found in the place to be searched; and (3) that persons
authorizing searches, although not necessarilyjudges, must at least be capable of actingjudicially (ibid.
at 109-10, 114-15).
Ibid.
See Baron v. Canada, [1993] I S.C.R. 416, (1993), 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 at 532-33 [Baron cited to
C.C.C.]: "[Tihis court established in Hunter that astandard of credibly based probability rather than
mere suspicion should be applied in determining when an individual's interest in privacy is subordinate
to the needs of law enforcement."
Supra note 104.
Ibid. at 14. See also R. v. Wiley, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263, (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 161 at 168: "Searches
founded upon either common law principles or statutory provisions may be 'authorized by law' within
the meaning of s. 8." See also Caslake, supra note 137 at 105-106, further clarifying the lawfulness
requirement.
See R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495, (1988), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296 at 320-21 [Simmons cited to
C.C.C.]; Jacques,supranote 106 at 9; R. v. Monney, [19991 I S.C.R. 652, (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129
at 147-48, 150 [Monney cited to C.C.C.], dealing with border/custom searches. See Comiteparitaire
de I'industrie de la chemise v. Potash, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406, (1994), 21 C.R.R. (2d) 193 at 202-204;
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, [199011 S.C.R. 425, (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 at 475-78 [Thomson
Newspapers cited to C.C.C.]; R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R.2627, (1990), 55 C.C.C.
(3d) 530 at 542-46 [McKinlay Transport cited to C.CC.], relating to administrative or regulatory
searches. See R. v. M(M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, (1998), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 361 at 377-79, 382-85,
dealing with searches of students while in school for disciplinary purposes.
See R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, (1993), 84 C.C.C.(3d) 173 at 187: "this court remains vigilant
with respect to searches conducted in relation to criminal investigations, given that the liberty of
individuals is ultimately at stake." See also Thomson Newspapers, ibid. at 476-77, emphasizing that
citizens have "a very high expectation of privacy in respect of such investigations."
See R.v. M. (MR.), supra note 182 at 383: "The other basic principle enunciated in the Hunter decision
was that a reasonable search must be based on reasonable and probable grounds.... The requirement
of reasonable and probable grounds has been maintained subject only to very limited exceptions e.g.,
search incident to arrest; see Cloutierv. Langlois." See also Golden, supra note 137 at para. 84; R. v.
Stillman, [1991] I S.C.R. 607, (1997), 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 at 340 [Stillman cited to C.C.C.].
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reasonable and probable grounds to believe anything will be found.'
It must be
remembered, however, that a precondition for this power is a lawful arrest. 86
' As the Supreme
Court has explained, from the standpoint of s. 8, such an exception "isjustifiable because the
arrest itself requires reasonable and probable grounds (under s. 494 of the Code) or an arrest
warrant (under s. 495)." 187
In contrast, searches incidental to investigative detentions are not premised on the
existence of reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the suspect has committed a
crime, or that he or she might be in possession of contraband or evidence. Instead, such
encounters are based upon the less onerous reasonable suspicion standard. Given that courts
in Canada are obligated to develop the common law in accordance with the specific
guarantees and fundamental values enshrined in the Charter, ' it seems doubtful whether the
judicial recognition of an incidental search power is constitutionally possible.8 9 This no
doubt factors into why almost half of those appellate courts that have endorsed the
investigative detention power have not yet accepted any incidental search power." 0 Arguably,
however, a limited search power could be developed in accordance with s. 8 of the Charter.
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See Cloutier, supra note 137 at 274, making clear that such a search does not require reasonable and
probable grounds beyond the grounds that were sufficient to support the lawfulness of the arrest itself
See also Stillman, ibid.
See Stillman, ibid. at para. 27, indicating that "[n]o search, no matter how reasonable, may be upheld
under this common law power where the arrest which gave rise to it was arbitrary or otherwise
unlawful." See also Caslake, supra note 137 at 106; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, (1997), 115
C.C.C. (3d) 129 at 159-60 [Feeney cited to C.CC.].
Caslake, ibid. For an explanation of the arrest power, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See RWDSU, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174
at 198: "the courts ought to apply and develop the principles of the common law in a manner consistent
with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution." See also Cloutier, supra note 137 at 26667; R. v. Salituro, 11991] 3 S.C.R. 654, (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 301, 305 [Salituro cited to
C.CC.]; Swain, supra note 46 at 510; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [199413 S.C.R. 835,
(1994), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 314-15; Hill v. Church ofScientologyof Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130,
(1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129 at 152-59; Golden, supra note 137 at 488-89.
See Renee M. Pomerance, "The Unreasonable and the Arbitrary - Recent Developments Under
Sections 8 and 9 of the Charter" (1994), 6 J.M.V.L 127 at 153, arguing that "[tihe power of the police
to detain on the basis of articulable cause does not translate into a lower constitutional standard for
investigative activity involving search or seizure.... [This is because] section 8 of the Charter ...
requires, as a constitutional minimum, that search/seizure activity be based on reasonable and probable
grounds." See also Coughlan, supra note 107 at 62-63.
See e.g. R. v. Polashek (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 434, 134 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (C.A.). Polashek implicitly
questioned whether pocket searches would be constitutional incident to an investigative detention,
pointing out that a court contemplating such a power would "have to consider the impact of recent
amendments to the Criminal Code. Sections 117.02 and 487.11 authorize warrantless searches of the
person in exigent circumstances but generally only based upon reasonable grounds. Section 11(7) of
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is to a similar effect" (ibid. at 198-99). The clear implication
being that if Parliament is respecting the reasonable and probable grounds standard for weapons
searches, courts surely must do the same: see also R. v. Levis (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 540, 122 C.C.C. (3d)
481 (C.A.) [Lewis cited to C.C.C.], in which the Court dealt with an investigative detention that
included a search of a traveller's luggage. The Court indicated that authority for this search required
a valid consent, at no point suggesting that an investigative detention carries with it an incidental search
power, even for protective purposes (ibid. at 493). See also R. v. Power (2001), 204 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.
221,48 C.R. (5th) 177 (C.A.), implicitly rejecting the existence of an incidental search power. See also
Aman S. Patel, "Detention and Articulable Cause: Arbitrariness and Growing Judicial Deference to
Police Judgment" (2001) 45 Crim. L.Q. 198 at 205-206.
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In Hunter, the Supreme Court made clear that reasonableness is a context-specific
determination 9 ' - opening the door to less onerous safeguards for searches in the
92
regulatory, administrative, customs, and school contexts. ' The way in which a search power
is labelled, however, is not necessarily determinative of the protections required for it to be
considered reasonable. 9 Rather, two factors have been key to this determination in the
Court's opinions: the privacy expectation involved, and the intrusiveness of the search power
being considered. 94 In cases where privacy expectations are high and the search power is
quite intrusive, such as where state action would interfere with an individual's bodily
integrity, the Supreme Court has required even greater protections than those demanded by
Hunter.'95 In contrast, where privacy expectations are diminished and the search power is not
very intrusive, the Supreme Court has signalled that slight deviations from the reasonable and
probable grounds standard may be constitutional.' 96
On this basis, a convincing argument could be made, similar to that accepted by the Court
in Terry, in favour of a limited protective search power. Admittedly, individuals enjoy a
relatively high expectation of privacy in their persons, including the contents of their pockets
and any bags or parcels they may be carrying. That said, it could be argued that those
expectations are somewhat diminished with respect to the bulges and hard edges produced
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Hunter,supra note 176, at 115, noting that "[w]here the State's interest is not simply law enforcement
as, for instance, where State security is involved, or where the individual's interest is not simply his
expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant
standard might well be a different one."
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See McKinlay Transport,supra note 182 at 542-43, Wilson J., concurring: "Since individuals have
different expectations of privacy in different contexts and with regard to different kinds of information
...
it follows that the standard of review of what is 'reasonable' in a given context must be flexible if
it is to be realistic and meaningful"; Baron, supra note 179 at 529: "The point is that the
characterization of certain offences and statutory schemes as 'regulatory' or 'criminal', although a
useful factor, is not the last word for the purpose of Charteranalysis." See also 14371 CanadaInc. v.
Quebec (A.G.), [1994] 2 S.C.R.339, (1994), 90 C.C.C. (3d) I at 32.
See Simmons, supra note 182 at 320-21 and Jacques, supra note 106 at 8-9, both emphasizing the
substantially diminished privacy expectations of travellers crossing international boundaries in
accepting deviations from Hunter's requirements. See also Thomson Newspapers, supra note 182 at
475-76, emphasizing the diminished privacy expectations of those operating businesses in regulated
fields to explain why deviations from Hunter's requirements are constitutional. See also McKinlay
Transport Ltd., supra note 182 at 546, Wilson J., concurring, noting that "[t]he greater the intrusion
into privacy interests of an individual, the more likely it will be that safeguards akin to those in Hunter
will be required"; Baron, supra note 179 at 530-31, holding that under the Income Tax Act, "[gliven
the intrusive nature of searches and the corresponding purpose of such a search to gather evidence for
the prosecution of a taxpayer, I see no reason for a radical departure from the guidelines and principles
expressed in Hunter."
See R. v. Dyment, [19881 2 S.C.R. 417, (1988), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 244 at 262: "when the search and
seizure relates to the integrity of the body rather than the home, for example, the standard is even higher
than usual." See also Stillman, supra note 184 at 342; Monney, supra note 182 at 151-52; Golden,
supra note 137 at para. 88.
See R. v. Wise, [1992] 1S.C.R. 527, (1992), 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 229 [Wise cited to C.C.C.]: after
noting that the privacy expectation in one's vehicle is "markedly diminished" relative to one's home
or office, the Court indicated that given that a electronic tracking device only reveals a vehicle's
location, it is "a less intrusive means of surveillance than electronic audio or video surveillance.
Accordingly, a lower standard such as a 'solid ground' for suspicion would be a basis for obtaining an
authorization from an independent authority, such as a justice of the peace, to install a device and
monitor the movements of a vehicle."

372

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

372

(2003) 41:2
(2003) 41:2

by concealed weapons. As a result, an incidental search power could be considered
reasonable under s. 8, subject to true limitations on both its availability and its scope.
From an objective standpont, beyond the existence of articulable cause for a detention,
there ought to be something about the circumstances themselves to warrant taking protective
measures. The only way that reasonable privacy expectations can be reconciled with a
protective search power is if individual privacy interests are respected as much as possible.
This can be accomplished by overriding only the diminished privacy expectation in
concealed weapons on less than reasonable and probable grounds to search. This would mean
that the scope of any search power would have to be quite limited, permitting only a true patdown designed solely to detect weapons. Probing into and removing items from inside
pockets and bags would have to be restricted to those situations where the object felt, from
an objective standpoint, could potentially be a weapon. Anything less would invite pretextual searches and completely overrun the innocent individual's legitimate privacy interests.
Even though a limited search power may be considered constitutional, it does not follow
that the Supreme Court of Canada should recognize it. As the American experience teaches,
even a well-defined judicially-created search power, like that recognized in Terry, will be
incrementally expanded by lower courts well beyond its original design.197 Lower courts are
not very good stewards of judicially-created police powers. Rather, they have an
understandable tendency to continually expand the rule to endorse that police conduct being
challenged in a given case. After all, the case before the court is always the one where a
search actually yielded a weapon, contraband, or some other valuable evidence. In such
cases, it is difficult for a court to conclude, given the benefit of hindsight, that the decision
to search or the level of intrusiveness was unreasonable. In time, the cumulative effect of
these decisions is a blurring of any distinction between the sorts of searches that accompany
investigative stops and those historically associated with arrests.' 8
In contrast, Parliament is better positioned to decide the appropriate balance between
police officers' safety needs and the s. 8 Charterright of innocent Canadians. In addition,
it is more difficult (albeit far from impossible) for courts to manipulate statutory provisions
enacted by Parliament because their interpretation necessitates a certain level of deference.
The common law, however, is something over which the courts justifiably feel a certain
degree of ownership and, consequently, greater license to change as they deem necessary.
C.

LIMITS ON THE LENGTH OF DETENTIONS AND THE MOVEMENT OF SUSPECTS

Although the judgment in Simpson included language which suggested that investigative
detentions should be kept "brief," it did not set out any clear temporal limits. "' Similarly, the
judgment did not directly address whether detained individuals could be moved by police
from the location where the stop commenced and, if so, under what circumstances and how
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See supra notes 126 through 135 and accompanying text.
See Sankoff, supra note 174 at 48, arguing that if"[I]eft unchecked and without strict limits, the
articulable cause search risks becoming the exception that will swallow the s. 8 rule. It is important for
the courts to consistently reinforce the very important distinctions between detention and arrest."
See supra note 102 and accompanying text, reproducing the relevant passage from Simpson.

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION:

A

FAILED EXPERIMENT?

373

far. "° Unfortunately, subsequent decisions have not clarified either of these important and
related issues. As a result, after almost a decade, the cases are still bereft of clear guidance
on how much time and/or movement might serve to transform an investigative detention into
the sort of intrusive encounter that will be considered a conventional arrest requiring
reasonable and probable grounds to justify it.
On the question of temporal limits, courts have done little more than repeat the original
direction from Simpson that these encounters be kept "brief."2 °' Only once in the last decade
has a Canadian appellate court expressly acknowledged the danger of approving overly-long
investigative detentions. In rejecting the Crown's claim that the detention of a suspected
alimentary canal smuggler - in a "drug-loo" facility for five hours before formal arrest could be justified as an investigative detention under Simpson, the Ontario Court of Appeal
indicated that
[i]n
this case, the "detention" of the appellant had all the attributes of an arrest, but without the necessary
reasonable and probable grounds. I cannot accept that the common law power to make a brief detention based
upon articulable cause implies a power to detain a person for an almost unlimited period of time until the
suspect either produces evidence of his guilt or establishes his innocence. The danger of extending this limited
common law power to encompass the kind of situation presented in this case is obvious. Since the officers
would be acting outside any statutory authority, the Criminal Code provisions respecting arrest and the
20 2
requirement that the offender be taken before the courts would not seem to apply.

Unfortunately, beyond coming to a conclusion specific to this case (namely, that five hours
is too long to constitute a valid detention), the Court missed the opportunity to set down a
clear time limit for investigative detentions generally.
Absent clearly stated time limits, however, the risk that investigative stops might become
anything but "brief' is quite real, as a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal has already
served to illustrate. 2 3 That Court upheld the conduct of police in entering a residence with
guns drawn, in search of the supplier of drugs purchased in a recent undercover buy. The
police found a number of people at the location. All of them were directed to lie down, some
at gunpoint, while others were also handcuffed. The Court concluded that the police had
articulable cause to detain this group of people until a search warrant arrived.20 4 For our
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Supra note I at 494. The Simpson Court rejected that Duguaywas determinative - a case in which the

suspects were formally arrested, transported to the station-house, held for an extended period, and
interrogated at some length (see Duguay, supra note 47). Rather, the Court noted that Duguay involved
a"prolonged and highly intrusive detention," implying that the power it was creating would not go this
far, but without specifying any clear limits (Simpson, ibid. at 494).
See e.g. Ferris,supra note 3, merely indicating that "[i]n
these circumstances the police were entitled
to briefly detain the respondent for investigation and to safeguard themselves while they did so.... at
some point soon the detention would come to an end" (at para. 58 [emphasis added]).
R. v. Monney (1997), 120 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at para. 79 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd on other grounds, Monney,
supra note 182. The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately held that this detention was authorized by s.
98(l)(a) of the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I (2nd Supp.) and therefore did not address the
investigative detention power.
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See Dupuis, supra note 3.
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Ibid.; at para. 9, the Court restricted this power to cases involving a"serious or violent crime ...
where
it would not be possible for police to follow up on their inquiries if all of the persons present were
permitted to leave."
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purposes, the relevant point is not the entry, but the fact that the Court relied upon Simpson
to uphold the detention in this case despite its having "persisted for over an hour."2 5
There is even less guidance on the authority of police to move a suspect from the initial
location where a detention began. In a rare case where the movement of a suspect was
mentioned, the Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that it is permissible for police to move
detainees short distances.2"6 Beyond that, however, it remains an open question how much
movement might be too much, such as whether suspects can be required to sit in police
cruisers (as the driver in Simpson was), driven back to a crime scene, or even transported to
the station-house. Although such steps would seem at odds "with the general intent that
investigative detentions be brief and minimally intrusive,' 2 7 no appellate court has ever said
as much. After more than a decade, it remains unclear at what point the movement of a
suspect, when combined with other factors, such as the duration of a detention and the
intrusiveness of an accompanying search, might combine to force an encounter over the
threshold of arrest.208
Once again, if the American experience is any indication, concrete rules relating to each
of these issues will not be forthcoming anytime soon. After thirty-five years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has provided only minimal guidance on the amount of movement that is
permissible. Although its cases make clear that transporting a detainee back to the stationhouse will usually constitute an arrest,2" there is little direction on the amount of movement
that may otherwise be permitted.2"'
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Ibid.at para. 10. Today, the constitutionality of this sort of entry would be determined based upon R.
v. Silveira, [199512 S.C.R. 297, (1995) 97 C.C.C.(3d) 450 [Silveira cited to C.C.C.] and s. 11(7) of
the Controlled Drugs and SubstancesAct, S.C. 1996, c.19 [CDSA].

See e.g. Lewis, supranote 190. In Lewis, a suspect initially detained inan airport concourse was moved

by police to a private room about twenty feet away. The Court characterized the decision to move the
suspect as "appropriate" (ibid. at para. 27).
McCoy, supra note 109 at 326.
The Supreme Court has held that an "arrest" "consists of the actual seizure or touching of a person's
body with a view to his detention" or, alternatively, the pronouncing of "words of arrest" if"the person
sought to be arrested submits to the process and goes with the arresting officer" (see R. v. Whitfield,
[1970] S.C.R. 46, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 129 at 130). The failure to use the word "arrest" is not
determinative; rather, it is the substance of the encounter that matters most, and the use of language that
reasonably leads an individual to conclude that he or she is in police custody and not free to leave. See
Latimer, supra note 106 at paras. 22-26. See also Asante-Mensah, supranote 106 at paras. 42-46. Of
course, focusing on these technical definitions alone can cause one to miss the essence of an "arrest":
"the hallmarks of an arrest are a prolonged loss of one's freedom of movement, either through
acquiescence or physical restraint, accompanied by a marked reduction in personal privacy" (see
Stribopoulos, supra note 8 at 232).
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 at 213 (1979): the accused was transported back to the
station-house, detained in an interrogation room and questioned for over an hour before he finally
confessed - the Court cautioned that "any 'exception' that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that
in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are 'reasonable'
only if based on probable cause." See also Hayes v. Florida,470 U.S. 811 (1985), holding that suspects
cannot be transported back to the station-house and held there - even briefly - under the authority
of Terry.
See Floridav. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer, the accused was originally stopped in an airport
concourse but then moved 40 feet to a police office where he was interrogated behind a closed door,
while the officers held his ticket and identification. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was
violated, noting that "[als
a practical matter, Royer was under arrest" (ibid. at 503). But the court also
noted that "there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect
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Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently refused to impose any fixed limits upon
the potential duration of investigative stops. Therefore, it is also unclear how much time can
pass before a "detention" is characterized as an "arrest" requiring probable cause.2 ' Instead,
the Court has embraced a case-by-case approach:
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it
appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant ... A
court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing
21 2
situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.

In adopting this approach, the Court rejected "aperse rule that a 20-minute detention is too
long to be justified under the Terry doctrine. 21 3 It feared that a time limit would interfere
with the ability of the "authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any
particular situation. 21 4
A flexible, fact-specific standard, however, carries its own unique drawbacks. First, as the
American Law Institute (the Institute) explained in endorsing a twenty minute rule, "[i]t is
important that a police officer have a clear notion of how long he may hold a person and
when he must tell that person he is free to go." Failing that, the Institute warned, the meaning
of "brief' "might in certain circumstances plausibly appear to an officer to be a period of one
or two hours., 215 Second, under a flexible standard, courts will be more inclined to accept
that the police acted appropriately. After all, cases seen by the courts are invariably those in
which the delay paid off, where contraband or evidence was ultimately acquired, and where
hindsight compels the court to conclude that the police acted reasonably. Over time, the
danger is that courts will extend the duration of stops so far that the line between
investigative detentions and conventional arrests will be practically eliminated." 6
None of this is intended as an argument in favour of courts adopting a fixed time limit on
investigative stops. The fact is that the U.S. Supreme Court and the American Law Institute
are both right. The problem is that courts are ill-equipped to offer the best of both
approaches. In contrast, by enacting legislation, Parliament can do just that. It can delineate
the circumstances under which a suspect may be moved and set out clear restrictions. In
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from one location to another during an investigatory detention, such as from an airport concourse to a
more private area" (ibid. at 504-505).
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)
[Sharpe]. But see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) [Place], insinuating at 709-10 that 90
minutes might be outside the limit. But see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
(1985) [Montoya de Hernandez], upholding an 18-hour investigative detention of a suspected
alimentary canal smuggler. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, "'Seizures' Typology: Classifying
Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues" (1984) 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref.
417.

212
213

Sharpe, ibid. at 686.
Ibid.
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Place, supra note 211 at 709, n. 10.
American Law Institute, A Model Code Of Pre-ArraignmentProcedure (Washington, D.C.: 1975) at
283. In its Model Code, the Institute adopts a 20-minute rule; ibid., § 110.2(1).
See e.g. Montoya de Hernandez, supra note 211, where the detention of a suspected alimentary canal
smuggler for18 hours was upheld under the Terry doctrine.
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addition, Parliament can impose a time limit on investigative stops - a point by which, if
a suspect has not been arrested, he or she must be released. This can be combined with a
procedure for extending such detentions in cases where it is necessary to do so. Extension
could require the approval of a senior officer who would have to concur in the continued
existence of articulable cause. Finally, to minimize the risk of such extensions being abused,
their number could be limited and a reporting requirement could be imposed upon senior
officers with respect to each extension granted. This is just one of several options. The
important point here is that effective regulation is possible under a comprehensive legislative
scheme, while far from likely under a patchwork ofjudicially-created rules.
THE RIGHTS UNDER SECTIONS I 0(A) AND I0(B) OF THE CHARTER

D.

The final consideration in this part is an issue unique to Canada. In the United States, the
rationale for developing the Miranda warnings was the need to dissipate the inherent
coerciveness of the police custodial environment." 7 According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
the "comparatively non-threatening" nature of Terry stops means that they do not trigger a
need to comply with Miranda'ssafeguards."' These warnings only become necessary when
"a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest."" 19 As
a result, police officers in the United States are free to question those detained, to confirm
or dispel the suspicion that led to a stop, unencumbered by any obligation to appraise the
suspect of either the right to silence or the right to counsel.
In contrast, the constitutional guarantees found in s. 10 of the Charterare not contingent
on entry into the police custodial environment. Rather, they confer "the right on arrest or
detention ...to be informed promptly of the reasons therefore" (10(a)) and "to retain and
instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right" (10(b))."' Given the well
established and relatively low threshold for a "detention,"22' the clear implication seems to
be that these rights must be respected during an investigative stop.222 As a practical matter,
it is relatively easy for a police officer to comply with s. 10(a) by simply telling a suspect
why he or she is being detained. The same is not true for the right to counsel guaranteed by
s. 10(b).
The difficulty arises when an individual, upon being informed of that right, responds by
asking to speak with a lawyer. Absent a situation of urgency, such a request obligates a police
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See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 467 (1966), explaining this rationale.
See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 at 439-40 (1984): the issue in Berkemer was whether Miranda
warnings had to be given as part of an ordinary traffic stop. The Court reasoned that "the usual traffic
stop" is analogous to a "so called 'Terry stop"' and then indicated that "[tihe comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of
ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are
not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda."
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Ibid. at 440.
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Supra note 40, ss. 10(a) and 10(b) [emphasis added].
See supra notes 43 through 45 and accompanying text.
See Pomerance, supranote 189 at 152-53, arguing that a Simpson stop must engage ss. 10(a) and 10(b)

221
222

as both of these rights are "automatically triggered by detention."
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officer to facilitate contact with counsel and, in the interim, to hold off on any questioning.1
As a logistical matter, it would be impossible for counsel to be consulted during most
investigative detentions, given that they usually take place on the street and must be kept
"brief." As a result, it is difficult to reconcile the requirements of s. 10(b) with the
investigative detention power. Unfortunately, despite this obvious conflict, Simpson did not
provide police officers with any guidance on how to resolve it in the field.224 Again,
subsequent decisions have failed to correct this original shortcoming.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal seemed to assume in one of its decisions that s.
10(b) applies to investigative detentions.225 In that judgment, however, the Court did not
explain how police officers are to reconcile the right to counsel with the inherent limits of
these encounters. Rather, the Court devoted its analysis almost exclusively to explaining why,
in that case, the s. 10(b) violation was too attenuated from the evidence found during a search
of the suspects' vehicle to be considered for exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 26
The Ontario Court of Appeal has not done much better. It found a s. 10(b) violation where,
during an investigative detention and based on his purported consent, the police did not
appraise a detainee of his right to counsel prior to searching his bag for evidence. In coming
to this conclusion, however, the Court deliberately restricted the impact of its decision to
stops that are accompanied by consensual searches. 227 The Court'sjudgment did not provide
much needed guidance on the extent to which the right to counsel might apply more generally
during investigative detentions.
The only Court that has supplied a clear answer to that question is the Alberta Court of
Appeal, although its approach is not immune to criticism. After endorsing a protective search
power, the Court held that a s. 10(b) warning need not precede such a search. The Court
explained this conclusion by noting that because "the right to search pursuant to a lawful
detention is in place to protect the safety of the officers, it is not likely to be undone by a
failure to first warn of a right to counsel. '228 There are a couple problems with this pragmatic
solution. First, it flies in the face of the Supreme Court's prior opinions which clearly held
that a detainee must at least be informed of the right to counsel immediately upon
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See R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3d) 385 at 391-92.
Simpson, supra note I at 504, averting to the issue but noting that "counsel has not alleged a violation
of s. 10(b) of the Charter and I will not address the s. 10(b) implications raised by this case."
Hyatt, supra note 15 1, initially noting at para. 7, that there was a violation of s. 10(b), but later locating
its analysis beneath the heading, "The alleged breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right" (ibid.
at 417 [emphasis added]).
Ibid. at 417-21.
In Lewis, supra note 190 at para. 28, the Court indicated, "[w]ithout deciding whether every
investigative detention requires compliance with s. I0(b), I would hold that this investigative detention,
which encompassed a search of the respondent's luggage, gave rise to an obligation that the police
inform the respondent of his right to counsel: R. v. Debot." Debot held that when an individual is
detained, a s. 10(b) warning must precede any search premised upon consent (supra note 51 at 199).
TA. V, supra note 157 at para. 35.
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detention.229 Second, it essentially upholds a violation of a s. 10(b) without engaging in the
analysis required by s. I of the Charter prior to overriding a constitutional right.
There is established precedent for using s. I to uphold a law that violates s. 10(b) in
situations where it would not be feasible for a detainee to speak with a lawyer. For example,
the Supreme Court used s. 1 to uphold the suspension of the right to counsel implicit in the
Criminal Code provisions for administering roadside breath tests to suspected impaired
drivers.230 Provincial appellate courts have applied s. I in this same way. They have upheld
police powers to conduct routine vehicle stops, pursuant to provincial traffic legislation,
without the need to apprise detained motorists of their right to counsel.' It is important to
note, however, that each of these examples involved legislatively-created police powers
overriding the right to counsel.
There is no precedent for a judicially-created police power overriding a constitutional
guarantee being justified under s. I of the Charter. It is not entirely surprising that the issue
has not arisen before, given that the ancillary powers doctrine has been used only
sporadically to create new police powers. It is not clear how this matter might be resolved.
Although the Supreme Court has applied s. I to uphold an established common law rule that
clashed with a specific Charter right,232 it has generally insisted that the courts develop the
common law in a manner consistent with the specific guarantees and larger values protected
by the Charter. " Given the inherent conflict between investigative detentions and the
requirements of s. 10(b), the judicial creation of such a power puts the Court in a rather
awkward position. On the one hand, the Court would be licensing a violation of the right to
counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) of the Charter, while also bearing primary responsibility, as
'
"guardian of the Constitution,"234
for the enforcement of the very same right. These functions
are fundamentally conflicting: the former is legislative in nature, the latter is judicial.
Unfortunately, this sort of conflict is an inevitable by-product of courts using the ancillary
powers doctrine to create new police powers. This provides an additional reason why the
creation of an investigative detention power is probably best left to Parliament.
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See Debot, supra note 51 at 198, holding that "immediately upon detention, the detainee does have the
right to be informed of the right to retain and instruct counsel. However, the police are not obligated
to suspend the search incident to arrest until the detainee has the opportunity to retain counsel." In
essence, the detainee must be informed of the right immediately, even though facilitation of contact
with counsel may be delayed. See also Feeney, supra note 186 at 160.
See Thomsen, supra note 43, holding that although those subject to roadside breath demands under s.
234.1(1) of the Criminal Code are "detained" for the purposes of s. 10(b), the legislative scheme
implicitly overrides that right, given the impracticality of complying with that right at the roadside, and
upholding this violation as demonstrably justifiable under s. I of the Charter.
See e.g. R. v. Ellerman (2000), 255 A.R. 149 (C.A.), applying s. I of the Charter to uphold s. 119 of
the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. H-7.
See B.C.G.E.U v. BritishColumbia (A.G.), [ 988]2 S.C.R. 214,(1988),44 C.CC. (3d) 289 at 311-14,
applying s. I to uphold the common law of criminal contempt and an injunction ordered pursuant to
that power as a reasonable limit on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the
Charter.
See supra note 188.
Hunter,supra note 176 at 105.
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REGULATION OR LEGITIMIZATION - SOME CONCLUSIONS

The Supreme Court of Canada should think carefully before deciding to endorse a
judicially-created investigative detention power. If the American experience can teach us
anything, it is that a case-by-case approach to the explication of police powers associated
with investigative detention can be dangerous. It invariably takes place while a guilty person
is before the court, evoking a strong desire to affirm the conduct of the police and ensure that
wrongdoing is punished.235 This leads to an almost inevitable expansion of police authority.
As one American commentator recently observed,
Terry has not succeeded.... the nature ofjudicial review contemplated - deferential review of discretionary,
low profile, street level decisions according to a malleable balancing standard - was poorly suited to achieve
the desired result of creating clear guidelines for the use of stop and frisk.... It offered little guidance about
what sorts of police conduct would be permissible ... It should come as no surprise that ... movement by the
lower courts, prosecutors, police, and even the Supreme Court itself has been inexorably away from Terry's
narrow holding and toward increased police discretion.... Judicial review has not succeeded in controlling the
widespread abuse of stop and frisk, the vast brunt of which falls, as it did in 1968, on minority suspects.236

Clearly, many of these observations apply with equal force with respect to the investigative
detention experiment in Canada over the past ten years. Arguably, however, the effect in
Canada has already been worse. The expansion of police power has been faster and much
more substantial than in the United States. And while the cases have served to expand police
authority, they have done little to delineate the outer limits of police power. After ten years,
a number of critically important issues remain unresolved, including: (1) how much force
police officers can use to effect a stop; (2) whether there is an incidental search power and
its precise scope; (3) the circumstances in which a suspect can be moved, and how much
235
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See William J. Stuntz, "Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies"( 1991) 77 Va. L. Rev. 88 1. arguing
that the distorting effect of hindsight is particularly acute when the exclusion of incriminating evidence
is at stake in a criminal case because "in the exclusionary rule case, the fact that the evidence was found
inevitably makes the claimant seem undeserving. One of the prerequisites for the defendant's ... claim
- the existence of suppressible evidence of crime - tends to suggest that the defendant deserves
punishment, not relief.... Even honest judges, acting in good faith, may find their judgment distorted
when the police officer's suspicion turned out to be justified, and the defendant is seeking relief from
the consequences of his own criminal conduct" (at 912-13 [emphasis in original]). See also Carole S.
Steiker, "Second Thoughts About First Principles" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820 at 852-53.
Susan Bandes, "Terry v. Ohio In Hindsight: The Perils Of Predicting The Past" (1999) 16 Const.
Commentary 491 at 493-94 [footnotes omitted]. The author is not alone in these observations. A
number of American commentators share a similar view. See Maclin, supra note 98, at 1334-35, who
in 1990 described the legacy of Terry as "two decades of rulings enlarging the government's
investigatory powers" that have served to "sharply curtail" the "right of locomotion." See Harris,
"Particularized Suspicion," supra note 128, who argued at 1022-23 that while the U.S. Supreme Court
continues to assert that "Terry is a well-balanced, carefully crafted decision which limits police power
... lower court cases expand that police power almost continually." Of course, there are also those who
argue that Terry has lived up to its lofty objectives: see e.g. Saltzburg, supra note 91. At the same time,
other commentators give the decision a more mixed review; see e.g. Debra Livingston, "Police Patrol,
Judicial Integrity, And The Limits of Judicial Control" (1998) 72 S. John's L. Rev. 1353 at 1359-61,
observing that the importance of Terry is "its dispelling of the illusion ofjudicial control" over police
detention practices while noting that the larger task of "placing reasonable constraints on police ...
remains unfinished today," but arguing that "Terry points us in the right direction - to the integration
ofjudicial, political, and administrative controls, rather than to an illusory reliance on exclusionary rule
litigation alone."
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movement is permitted; (4) how long a detention can last; and (5) to what extent the right to
counsel must be respected during a detention.
Resolving these important issues through a case-by-case approach is inherently
problematic. Some key questions may take years to answer, while others may never be
resolved. In the interim, without the benefit of much needed guidance, police officers will
still be required to make on-the-spot decisions in response to the suspicious and often
dangerous situations they confront in the field. In this context, most police officers will soon
recognize that the "law on the books" does not actually speak to the reality of the street. The
way in which police will respond to this predicament is already known. They will continue
to do what they perceive as necessary to get the job done.237 No doubt, for the officer who
is already inclined to use his or her discretion inappropriately, a lack of clear and
comprehensive rules only serves to increase the very real potential for abuse.2" 8
In this light, the effect of Simpson and its progeny is made clear. The impact of these cases
has not been regulatory at all. Rather, on a practical level, the decisions have primarily served
to authorize encounters that are very much "arrest-like" based on "reasonable suspicion" a much less demanding standard than the "reasonable and probable grounds" long required
by Parliament for arrests. And while police authority has grown, after-the-factjudicial review
in those comparatively rare cases where an unjustified stop actually yielded evidence of
criminality has done very little to keep police investigative detention practices in check. As
a result, experience suggests that Professor Delisle's early cynicism regarding Simpson's
purported regulatory objectives wasjustified. At the time, he noted that "the court in Simpson
is not 'regulating'. It is not restricting police powers. It is not standing between the
government and the citizen and interpreting laws which authorize police conduct. It is
'
creating new police powers!"239
Regrettably, subsequent decisions have not managed to do
much better.
V. LARGER LESSONS: POLICE POWERS, THE COURTS, AND THE CHARTER
A.

INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF COURTS
(WHY PARLIAMENT IS BETTER SUITED TO THE TASK)

None of the above is intended as an indictment of any particular court. Rather, the
difficulty with the investigative detention cases is symptomatic of a larger institutional
shortcoming. Quite simply, courts are not very effective at either setting public policy or
implementing the rules that flow from their policy choices. 4 ' If the goal is the effective
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See Kelling & Coles, supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 99 through 100 and accompanying text.
Ronald J. Delisle, "Judicial Creation of the Police Powers" (1993) 20 C.R. (4th) 29 at 30.
There are a number of reasons for this, including: (I) courts do not choose their cases, they can only
address those issues that are raised by the cases and parties that happen to come before them; (2) courts
typically only hear from the parties regarding the issue(s) in dispute between them, a fact that limits
their ability to explore all possible alternatives or to gain a broader perspective on the issues raised; (3)
judges are generalists, and lack the necessary expertise to choose the correct solution among what are
frequently complex and specialized policy options; (4) because of the limits of the adjudicative process,
courts are ill suited for ascertaining relevant social facts which are usually essential for the development
of sound social policy but often irrelevant to the disposition of the particular case being considered; (5)
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regulation of police detention practices, these inherent institutional limitations unfortunately
combine to destine any judicially-created scheme for failure.
The experience of the last ten years demonstrates that courts, unlike legislatures, are illsuited to the task of creating the sort of clear, comprehensive and prospective rules that are
essential if police discretion is to be meaningfully structured and confined. This shortcoming
is endemic to the incremental nature of judicial rule-making. In addition, in making public
policy choices about how to best balance collective versus individual interests in the criminal
investigative process, courts "deal with specific cases that ordinarily involve people who
have broken the law, a fact that does not encourage the broader perspective that should be
brought to the issue."24 ' As the previous Part demonstrates, courts faced with the factuallyguilty accused are under an almost irresistible pressure to continually expand police power.
Finally, given the limits of exclusionary rule litigation, restricted as it is to cases where
unjustified detentions happen to yield evidence, the vast majority of groundless stops
continue to go unchecked under a judicially-created regulatory scheme.
Unlike Parliament, courts are unable to mandate the sort of administrative procedures that
stand the best chance of truly keeping police detention practices in check. For example, as
argued above, comprehensive legislation could include a requirement that after a certain
amount of time, a suspect must be released unless a senior officer approves an extension of
the length of that detention. As noted, the risk of extensions being abused could be minimized
by also making each one subject to a reporting requirement. Of course, reporting
requirements could be mandated for every investigative detention - as is the case in other
jurisdictions.242 Police officers could be required to complete and file a form that includes,
for example, the officer's name, police force and badge number, the detainee's name (if
ascertained), a physical description of the detainee (including his or her race), the date, time,
and location of the stop, and the reasons for the stop. The report could also detail the nature
of any force used and the reasons it was necessary, the scope of any search that was carried
out, including its justification and the results, the duration of the stop, and how the encounter
ended (that is, whether the suspect was released or arrested). To reduce the burden imposed
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courts lack the ability to monitor the policy implications of their judgments and to efficiently modify
the rules they promulgate in light of those developments. See Alan Young, "Fundamental Justice and
Political Power: A Personal Reflection On Twenty Years In The Trenches" (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 121
at 125. See also Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750 [Watkins], acknowledging many of these
institutional limitations at 760-61. See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy
(Washington: Brookings Institute, 1977); Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281; Mauro Capelleti, "The Law Making Power of the Judge and
its Limits: A Comparative Analysis" (1981) 8 Monash U.L. Rev. 15.
R. v. Evans, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 23 at 28, LaForest J., concurring.
For example, in the U.K., the particulars of each investigative stop must be recorded by police officers;
see supra note 69 for a description of the reporting requirements in PACE. Similarly, the New York
City Police Force has required officers to complete such a form (the UF-250) since 1986; see New York,
Attorney General of the State of New York, The New York City Police Department's "'Stopand Frisk"
Practices: A Report to the People of the State of New York From The Office Of The Attorney General
(New York: Civil Rights Bureau, 1999), Chapter Three, Part II(C), online: "Stop and Frisk" Report
<www.oag.state.ny.usfpress/reports/stopfrisk/stopfrisk.html> [N.Y. Attorney General's Report].
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on police officers completing these forms, a checklist format could be used to record much
of this information.243
A reporting requirement would serve a number of important checking functions. These
forms could be used internally by the police force itself, so that specific officers with a
penchant for unjustified stops or inappropriate practices (for example, for using too much
force or searching unnecessarily) could be identified for closer supervision, further training,
discipline, and even dismissal. 44 Similarly, larger patterns within particular divisions or
forces could also be identified. For example, the forms could assist in revealing whether or
not a particular force engages in inappropriate practices, such as racial profiling. In specific
cases where racial profiling is alleged, the officer's past forms may go a considerable
distance in proving or refuting the allegation.2 45 It is most important to recognize that
effective checks are possible if the solution comes from Parliament, but quite unlikely if the
development of the investigative detention power remains exclusively with the courts.
Unfortunately, it is a rare occurrence for courts to acknowledge their own institutional
limitations. This is especially true in the areas of criminal law and criminal procedure. In
explaining the activist stance adopted by the Canadian judiciary in these areas since the
Charter'senactment, it has been noted that the courts believe that they have "an accumulated
body of expertise.... In these cases, the courts appear to regard themselves as having a kind
of 'comparative advantage' over the legislative branch, thereby justifying a more rigorous
standard of review ... [for this reason they have] ... been far more willing to intervene '2 46 in
this context. The ascent of the ancillary powers doctrine and its use to create an investigative
detention power are undoubtedly linked, in part, to this self-perception.
It seems but a small step to move from viewing courts as ideally suited to the task of
defining the contours of the Charter's legal rights provisions and standing as a bulwark
between individuals and the state, to concluding that courts are also competent to create and
effectively regulate police powers. These functions, however, are of an entirely different
nature. Giving meaning to the open-ended language found in the Charter'sguarantees, and
calling the state to task when these minimum constitutional standards are not met, lies at the
heart of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy. In contrast, granting police an

243

244

245

246

For example, in New York City, much of the information to complete the UF-250 is provided by
checking boxes that correspond to the available explanations, reducing the time necessary to complete
the form. The forms are filed with supervising officers, who must sign and log them before they are
compiled. See N.Y. Attorney General's Report, ibid Also see Kevin Flynn, "After Criticism of Street
Frisk Records, Police Expand Report Form" The New York Times (5 January 2001) B6 (reproducing
a copy of the current UF-250 form).
N.Y. Attorney General's Report, supra note 242, noting that at the N.Y.P.D. "a supervisor is required
to review and sign the form at the time it is prepared, and supervisors are held responsible for ensuring
that officers can articulate sufficient levels of suspicion for any action taken. In appropriate instances,
if they have committed violations or made mistakes, they are disciplined or retrained."
Ibid.: "In addition to informing the court what circumstances led the officer to believe that a stop was
necessary, the report also serves to protect the officer and the Department from allegations of police
misconduct which may sometimes arise from the proper performance of police duty."
Patrick J. Monahan, "The Charter Then and Now" in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds.,
Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter's Place in Canada's Political, Legal and
Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 105 at 116.
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entirely new investigative power, which in turn necessitates the resolution of a myriad of
difficult policy issues, is the type of task that falls squarely within the legislative function.
On a number of recent occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada has made comments
suggesting a keen awareness of, and a sensitivity towards, this important distinction.247 For
example, on behalf of the Court, Justice lacobucci explained that
in a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the legislature and not the courts which has the major
responsibility for law reform; and for any changes to the lav, whic) may have complex ramifications, however
necessary or desirable such changes may be, they should be left to the legislature. Thejudiciary should confine
itself to those incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and
evolving fabric of our society.248

Such statements ought to sound the death knell for the ancillary powers doctrine. Despite
this, there are a couple of reasons why it remains very much alive. First, as the investigative
detention power spread across the country, these cases served to revive the ancillary powers
doctrine, following an eight year hiatus after Dedman.249 Second, Dedman has never been
overturned. More importantly, in the wake of Simpson, the Supreme Court has again relied
on it and the ancillary powers doctrine to recognize a new police power.25 0 Now, as the
investigative detention power finally makes it way before the Supreme Court, Canadian
criminal procedure stands ataprecipice. The effect of the Court adopting ajudicially-created
investigative detention power will be to firmly entrench the ancillary powers doctrine in
Canadian law as a device for creating entirely new, complex, and far-reaching police powers.
In choosing whether to take Canadian law in this direction, the Supreme Court should bear
in mind the U.S. experience and recall the existence of some fundamental constitutional
differences between the two countries on matters of criminal procedure.
B.

RESISTING THE PULL OF THE AMERICAN CASE LAW

The American stop-and-frisk cases, as Part IV above made apparent, have had a
considerable influence on those Canadian appellate courts that have chosen to endorse the
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See Watkins, supra note 240 at 760-61, indicating "that major revisions of the law are best left to the
legislature. Where the matter is one of a small extension of existing rules to meet the exigencies of a
new case and the consequences of the change are readily assessable,judges can and should vary existing
principles. But where the revision is major and its ramifications complex, the courts must proceed with
great caution." See also Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. D.F.G., [ 1997] 3
S.C.R. 925 at para. 18; Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Ship Building Ltd., [1997] 3
S.C.R. 1210 at para. 93, McLachlin J.; R. v. Cuerrier, [199812 S.C.R. 371, (1998), 127 C.C.C. (3d)
I at para. 43, McLachlin J. concurring.
Salituro, supra note 188 at 301.
Dedman was decided in 1985. The ancillary powers doctrine that it endorsed was not used again until
1993 when it was relied upon in Simpson to recognize the investigative detention power; supra note 1.
See Godoy, supra note 106. In Godoy, the Supreme Court used the ancillary powers doctrineincluding Simpson's approach to the second prong of the Waterfield test - to vest police with the
power to enter private premises in response to a disconnected 911 call. This is the first time since
Dedman that the Supreme Court has relied upon the doctrine to recognize anew police power. No doubt
a sensible result, unfortunately, the decision does not speak to the host of other emergency situations
that might entitle police to enter premises without a warrant. In contrast, legislation could address the
problem more generally.
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investigative detention power. It is important to note, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court
developed the stop-and-frisk power under a different constitutional framework than that
which exists in Canada, within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment, and in the context
of a very different federal system.2"'
In the United States, the Supreme Court is charged with interpreting and applying the
Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. In doing so, it essentially sets minimum
2 2
standards for the nation that both state and federal officials are required to meet. " Under the
American federal system, criminal law and procedure is a federal as well as a state
responsibility. The bulk of criminal law, however, is enacted and enforced by individual
states.2" 3 In enforcing these laws, state officials must respect the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, as interpreted by the federal courts. That said, provided that they meet these
minimum standards, state legislatures and courts, operating within the parameters of state
constitutions, are entitled to create additional protections for their citizens." 4 These
differences should be remembered by Canadian courts before deciding to transplant
American criminal procedure jurisprudence to Canada.
A considerably different system is at work in Canada. Here, the Supreme Court interprets
the Charterunder a federal system of criminal law and procedure.2"' This means that in the
context of the Charterand its influence on police investigative powers, the Court is able to
engage in a very different kind of dialogue with Parliament than what is possible in the
United States. In the context of police powers, the constitutional judgments of the U.S.
Supreme Court speak not only to Congress, but also to fifty state legislatures which, at any
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On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged the need to use American
constitutional jurisprudence with caution when interpreting the Charter's guarantees. See R. v.
Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, (1990), 61 C.C.C. (3d) I at 32, pointing out that "Canada and the
United States are not alike in every way, nor have the documents entrenching human rights in our two
countries arisen in the same context. It is only common sense to recognize that, just as similarities will
justify borrowing from the American experience, differences may require that Canada's constitutional
vision depart from that endorsed in the United States." See also Rahey v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
585, (1987) 33 C.C.C.(3d) 289 at 325, LaForest J., concurring; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New
Brunswick (A.G.), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459, (1991), 67 C.C.C. (3d) 544 at 558-59; Ontario v. Canadian
Pacific Ltd., [199512 S.C.R. 1031, (1995), 99 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 139.
Initially, the Fourth Amendment only served as a restraint on the federal government. Like many of the
provisions in the Bill of Rights, however, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually concluded that it was so
"fundamental" that it was "incorporated" into the due process guarantee found in the Fourteenth
Amendment. This had the effect of extending the Fourth Amendment to the States. See Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which also incorporated
the exclusionary rule.
The federal government has the power to create criminal laws that deal with matters falling within the
heads of federal power. See U.S. Const. art. 1,§ I and art. I § 8. By default, everything else is left to the
states. See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J.King, Criminal Procedure, 3d ed. (St. Paul:
West Group, 2000) at 3-7.
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) at 34, noting that "[t]he States are not ...
precluded from
developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet 'the practical demands of
effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do not
violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures [contained in the Fourth
Amendment]."
See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s.
91(27), which grants the Federal Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "[tihe Criminal Law" and
"Procedure in Criminal Matters."
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given time, may employ rather varied approaches to the regulation of police practices." 6 By
default, if state law is silent on the scope of a police officer's authority in a given situation,
the officer is entitled to act up to the limits imposed by the federal constitution. Decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court thereby indirectly create police powers, at least in a negative sense,
by not prohibiting police conduct in certain situations.257
It is neither sensible nor necessary for the Supreme Court of Canada to follow the
American model of creating police investigative powers. One of the strongest criticisms
directed at the U.S. Supreme Court in recent history asserts that, under this model, the rules
created by its judgments are overly complex and therefore not very effective at regulating
police investigative practices.2"' This shortcoming has, in fact, caused some critics to
pronounce the criminal procedure revolution a failure and to call for comprehensive
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For example, in Terry, Ohio did not have legislation in place conferring authority upon police officers
to stop-and-frisk suspects. See Terry, supra note 88. In contrast, in a companion case to Terry, the
Court was dealing with a stop and frisk from New York State, where state legislation was in place that
expressly conferred a stop-and-frisk power upon the police: see Sibron, supra note 125 at 43-44, setting
out the relevant provisions from § 180 of the N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure.
For example, in Sibron (ibid. at 60-62) the U.S. Supreme Court refused to decide whether or not the
New York stop-and-frisk statute conformed with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. It
explained that
New York is, of course, free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs of
local law enforcement ... and in the process it may call the standards it employs by any names it
may choose. It may not, however, authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth
Amendment rights, regardless ofthe labels which it attaches to such conduct. The question in this
Court upon review of a state-approved search or seizure 'is not whether the search [or seizure] was
authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Just as a search authorized by state lav may be an unreasonable one under that
amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized by state lav be justified as a
constitutionally reasonable one' (ibid at 60-61 [emphasis added]).
See Tracey Macl in, "What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn From Vagueness Doctrine" (2001)
3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 398 at 422-23, noting that "Fourth Amendment law is certainly complex, but over
the last two decades the trend of the Court's cases has been to expand police power"; Gregory D. Totten,
Peter D. Kossoris & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, "The Exclusionary Rule: Fix It, But Fix It Right" (1999) 26
Pepp. L. Rev. 887 at 901, commenting upon the "complexity" and "unpredictability" of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and noting that the confusion "is not limited to police officers. Judges and
lawyers also have difficulty interpreting and applying the law in this difficult area"; Omar Saleem, "The
Age of Unreason: The Impact of Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, And Colorblindness On Terry
'Stop And Frisk' (1997) 50 Okla. L. Rev. 451 at 451, observing that "the rules governing general
public-police encounters are misleading, confusing, and susceptible to numerous interpretations"; Akhil
Reed Amar, "Fourth Amendment First Principles" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 at 758, noting that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence "is a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely
complex and contradictory, but often perverse"; Phyllis T. Bookspan, "Reworking The Warrant
Requirement: Resuscitating The Fourth Amendment" (1991) 44 Vand. L. Rev. 473 at 488, noting that
"fourth amendment jurisprudence is a mass of confusion that clouds and often eliminates fourth
amendment protections"; Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, "The Fourth Amendment As
Constitutional Theory" (1988) 77 Geo. L. J. 19 at 20, observing that "there is virtual unanimity,
transcending normal ideological dispute, that the Court simply has made a mess of search and seizure
law"; Craig M. Bradley, "Two Models of the Fourth Amendment" (1985) 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468 at
1472, observing that "the fundamental problem with fourth amendment law is that it is confusing. It
fails to inform the police how to behave and to inform the lower courts of the basis for the exclusionary
decision"; Albert W. Alschuler, "Bright Line Fever and The Fourth Amendment" (1984) 45 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 227 at 287, noting that the "system of case-by-case adjudication" has left "fourth amendment law
incomprehensible" and indicating that the cause of this "is not the lack of categorical rules but too
many of them."
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legislative reform to finally clean up the mess.259 Given these criticisms, the Supreme Court
of Canada would be wise to think carefully before starting down a similar path by endorsing
a judicially-created investigative detention power. The Court should remember that the
Canadian constitutional context arguably allows for something different - an approach that
avoids many of the pitfalls inherent in a system of judicially-created police powers.
A DIFFERENT APPROACH: POLICE POWERS

C.

AND THE CANADIAN DIALOGUE MODEL

Historically, there has been little political will in Canada for legislative reform directed
at police investigative powers. This is best demonstrated by Parliament's failure to implement
the recommendations made by the Law Reform Commission of Canada. Throughout the
1980s, the Commission conducted an almost wholesale review of Canadian criminal law and
procedure. Its efforts culminated in recommendations for sweeping legislative reforms that,
among other things, would have served to consolidate and simplify police investigative
powers.26 Unfortunately, few of the Commission's recommendations have ever been
implemented.
Prior to the Charter,there was no real incentive for Parliament to clarify the parameters
of police authority. Given that illegally obtained evidence was almost always admissible,
there was little practical benefit in expending limited political capital on an endeavour like
criminal procedure law reform.26 ' The advent of the Charter,whose substantive guarantees
combined with the discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence (s. 24(2)) and
the authority vested in the courts to invalidate unconstitutional laws (s. 52(1)), served to
change the stakes of political inaction. The Charter'sremedial provisions have given courts
the authority to make the legal rights of individuals matter, by imposing a cost on government
262
for disregarding them.
The consequences of inaction have served to transform the relationship between
Parliament and the Supreme Court, facilitating what has come to be termed a constitutional

259

2(4

2(1

262

See Craig M. Bradley, The Failureof the CriminalProcedureRevolution (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1993) at 37-56, 62-87, 49-51, 144-74.
See Canada, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Search and Seizure (Report 24) (Ottawa:
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1984); Canada, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report On
Arrest (Report 29) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986); Canada, Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Our CriminalProcedure (Report 32) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of
Canada, 1988); Canada, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal Procedure,
Volume 1, Police Powers (Report 33) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1991).
See R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272, [1970] 4 C.C.C. I at 17, recognizing only a limited discretion in
trial judges to exclude evidence if its admission would operate unfairly, but indicating that this would
only be the case where the evidence were gravely prejudicial, its admissibility tenuous, and its probative
value with respect to the main issue before the court trifling.
See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Thornton, "Reply to 'Six Degrees Of Dialogue"' (1999) 37 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 529 at 534, noting that the Charter"forces the legislative bodies to pay more attention to the
liberty of the individual and to show more respect for minorities than the majority's representatives in
the legislature are likely to do in the absence ofjudicial review."
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"dialogue."26 3 This dialogue has frequently played itself out in the criminal procedure
context. 2" While in the past, Parliament has been reluctant to amend the Criminal Code to
implement recommendations made by the Law Reform Commission of Canada, it has been
quick to respond with legislative reform whenever its hand has been forced by the Charter
decisions of the Supreme Court. In circumstances where the Court has held that a particular
investigative power or practice was unconstitutional, either because it lacked the necessary
legal authority, or because its enabling legislation did not meet minimum Charter
requirements, a legislative response has usually been forthcoming from Parliament. The
legislation has typically refined the investigative power involved "to build in civil libertarian
safeguards that meet the requirements of the Charter as set out by the Supreme Court of
26
Canada.""
This dynamic has been embraced by the Court, which has maintained that the
reciprocal institutional review that it entails has "the effect of enhancing the democratic
266
process, not denying

it.,

It is important to note a significant detail about this dialogue in the context of police
investigative powers. Each example involves a decision of the Supreme Court under s. 8 of
the Charter that prompted a legislative response from Parliament in the form of a codified
search power.267 These legislated powers respected the minimum constitutional requirements
set down by the Court under s. 8.268 From a practical standpoint, this has meant that most
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See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures"
(1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. Hogg and Bushell use the term "dialogue" somewhat narrowly,
restricting it to "those cases in which ajudicial decision striking down a law on Charter grounds is
followed by some action by the competent legislative body"; ibid. at 82. They contend that "Charter
challenges to the actions of police officers and other officials do not result in the striking down of a law,
and often will not give rise to any dialogue with the competent legislative body" but acknowledge that
"[iun some cases, however, a successful Charter challenge to the action of a police officer or other
official will expose a deficiency in the law that the competent legislative body will want to correct"
(ibid. note 15). Here, when I use the term "dialogue," I mean it to include cases in both categories,
essentially any judicial pronouncement under the Charter that provokes a legislative response.
See Roach, supra note 79 at 486, 518-23, listing the decisions and legislative responses.
Hogg & Bushnell, supra note 263 at 88.
Vriendv. Alberta, [ 1998] 1S.C.R. 493 at para. 139. See also R. v. Mills, [199913 S.C.R. 668, (1999),
139 C.C.C. (3d) 321 at 356-58; Roach, supra note 79 at 485, arguing that under this model, the Court
and Parliament play "distinctive yet complementary roles in resolving questions that involve rights and
freedoms ...
[and claiming that this] ...
can produce the most constructive partnership between courts
and legislatures."
See Criminal Code: s. 487.05, creating a legislative scheme for the issuance of DNA warrants, in
response to R. v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, (1994), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404; s . 487.091, creating a
legislative scheme for the issuance of body impression warrants, in response to Stillman, supra note
184; s. 492.1(1), creating a legislative scheme for the issuance of a warrants to place an electronic
tracking device on a vehicle, in response to Wise, supra note 196; s. 184. 1, creating a procedure for
participant surveillance, to ensure the safety of police officers involved in dangerous undercover
operations, in response to R. v. Wiggins, [1990] 1S.C.R. 62, (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 476 and R. v.
Duarte, [1990] I S.C.R. 30, (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) I; s. 487.01 creating a legislative scheme for a
general warrant to authorize the use of any investigative device, technique or procedure, in response to
Duarte, ibid, and R. v. Wong, [199013 S.C.R. 36, (1990), 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 [Wong cited to C.C.C.];
s. 487.11 (and s. 11(7) of CDSA, supra note 205), authorizing warrantless searches if the grounds for
a search with warrant exist but due to exigent circumstances it is not feasible to obtain one, in response
to comments by the Court in Silveira, supra note 205; ss. 529 & 529(1) creating a legislative scheme
for the issuance of a warrant to enter a dwelling-house to effect an arrest, in response to Feeney, supra
note
d 186.
Ibid.
For a discussion of these standards, see supranotes 176 through 183 and accompanying text.

ALBERTA L-AW REVIEW

(2003) 41:2

police search powers are now codified.269 These powers are defined in clear, comprehensive,
and prospective terms. In addition, because they are set out in the CriminalCode, they are
readily accessible to police officers, lawyers, and judges. Given all of this, a strong argument
can be made that, especially when compared to police detention practices, police search
powers are effectively regulated in Canada.
There are two principal reasons why the Charterserved to foster a dialogue that led to the
effective regulation of police search powers. First, early in the development of the s. 8
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court carried the principle of legality forward into the
guarantee.27 The Court held that, to be reasonable under s. 8, a search or seizure had to be
"authorized by law." 27' In coming to this conclusion, the Court categorically rejected a
number of early decisions that had concluded that an unlawful search or seizure was not
necessarily "unreasonable" under s. 8.272 Second, with one recent exception,273 the Court has
refrained from using the ancillary powers doctrine to create new police search and/or seizure
powers. In fact, it is in this context that the Court has made some of its strongest statements
against the judicial creation of police powers. For example, on one occasion, a majority of
the Court went so far as to indicate that "it
does not sit well for the courts, as the protectors
of our fundamental rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal
liberties. It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental rights if it is of the view
that they are needed for the protection of the public in a properly balanced system of criminal
'
justice."274
It was the Supreme Court's insistence on legal authority for searches and seizures,
and its refusal to supply it by creating new police powers, that led directly to the constructive
dialogue that emerged under s. 8 of the Charter.
In contrast, with respect to police detention powers and the right "not to be arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned" under s. 9 of the Charter,a meaningful dialogue has never gotten
off the ground.27 There are a couple of reasons for this. First, the principle of legality has not
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Not all, however. The search incident to arrest power was recognized at common law long before the
Charter and it has persisted as an uncodified search power. See supra note 137. See also supra notes
184 through 187 and accompanying text. In addition, the Supreme Court's recent use of the ancillary
powers doctrine to recognize a police power to enter private premises in response to disconnected 911
calls is obviously not a codified search power. See Godoy, supra note 106. See also supra note 250.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (explaining the principle of legality).
Collins, supra note 104 at 14. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See R. v. Haley (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 454 at 467 (Ont. C.A.), noting that "every illegality, however
minor or technical and peripheral or remote, does not.., render such search unreasonable." See also R.
v. Noble (1984), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Heisler (1984), 57 A.R. 230, II C.C.C. (3d) 475
(C.A.); R. v. Cameron (1984), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (B.C.C.A.).
See Godoy, supra note 106. See also supra note 250.
See Wong, supra note 267 at 486: a majority of the Court concurred with Justice LaForest's opinion,
which had offered this very strong statement in explaining why it would be inappropriate for the Court
to read the electronic surveillance provisions in the Code to authorize surreptitious video surveillance.
See also R. v. Evans, [1996] 1S.C.R. 8, (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 23 at 27-28, LaForest J. concurring,
for a similar statement about the appropriate role for the Courts under the Charter; R. v. Kokesch,
[199013 S.C.R.3, (1990), 61 C.C.C. (3d) 207 at 218-19, Dickson C.J.C., dissenting in the result only,
making clear that the authority for searches must come from clear statutory language and categorically
refusing to employ the common law to authorize same. See also Hunter, supra note 176 at 106, noting
that the Charter's purpose is to "constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and
freedoms [it guarantees]; it is not in itself an authorization for governmental action."
Charter, supra note 40, s. 9.
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been incorporated into s. 9. To the contrary, a number of appellate court cases have held that
an unlawful detention is not necessarily arbitrary.276 Although most commentators contend
that unlawful detentions should be treated as inherently arbitrary,277 the Supreme Court has
deliberately refrained from resolving this issue.27 Second, unlike search and seizure powers,
as Parts III and IV above demonstrated, over the last decade the ancillary powers doctrine
has been consistently used by appellate courts to supply police with the power to detain for
investigative purposes. In effect, the experience with police detention practices under s. 9 of
the Charter has been the opposite of the experience with police search practices under s. 8.
Assuming that effective regulation of police detention practices is the goal, the experience
under s. 8 of the Charter with police search powers offers an instructive model. If the
conditions for the effective regulation of police detention practices are ever to be realized,
Canadian courts must initiate the dialogue. As the previous two paragraphs make clear, there
are two simple steps that the Supreme Court can undertake to accomplish this critical
objective. First, the Court must finally acknowledge that a detention which is not authorized
by law is necessarily arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter.27 9 Second, the Court must reject any
use of the ancillary powers doctrine for all but the most minor and incremental changes to
the common law. By implication, this would necessarily require a rejection of the judiciallycreated investigative detention power. In taking these steps, the Supreme Court would finally
get the constitutional dialogue with respect to police detention practices up and running.
The regulatory benefits that would flow from taking these two steps would prove
considerable. Together, they would set the groundwork for a repetition of the experience
under s. 8 of the Charter. Invariably, because police officers must detain for investigative
purposes, cases would come before the courts where such "unlawful" police detentions
resulted in the acquisition of evidence. Due to an absence of legal authority, such detentions
would be labelled "arbitrary" under s. 9. In these initial cases, the Court might nevertheless
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See supra notes 46 through 50 and accompanying text. See also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 48.

27H

See Latimer, supra note 106; Lamer C.J.C., on behalf of the majority, indicated at para. 26 that "it is
not necessary to address that question, because Mr. Latimer's arrest was entirely lawful, and failing an
attack against the legislative provision which authorized the arrest, I do not see how a lawful arrest can
contravene s. 9 of the Charter for being arbitrary."
Beyond the regulatory benefits that would flow from such a conclusion, there are good reasons why this
interpretation isalso compelled by a "purposive" reading of s.9, including that: (i) the insistence inthe
early cases that there be a "capricious" or "despotic" mindset on the part of the arresting or detaining
officer does not accord with the Supreme Court's subsequent rejection of dictionary definitions in the
interpretation of the Charter's guarantees; (ii) an interpretation that equates "illegal" with "arbitrary"
respects the principle of legality, long a part of Anglo-Canadian constitutional law (in fact, unlawful
detentions were termed "arbitrary" at common law); (iii) the drafting history, in which a predecessor
provision to s. 9 equated illegal detentions with unconstitutional ones by prohibiting detentions that
were not "in accordance with procedures, established by law" (the change in wording was precipitated
by a desire to strengthen, rather than weaken, the guarantee); (iv) Art. 9(l) of the International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 16 December 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 17 1,Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47,
6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976), which prohibits
not only "arbitrary arrest or detention," but also all deprivations of liberty that are not "in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law," suggesting that equating arbitrary with unlawful under
s.9 would better accord with Canada's international treaty obligations; (v) such an interpretation would
bring consistency to the Legal Rights guarantees by developing analogous standards under ss. 8 and 9.
See Stribopoulos, supra note 8 at 267-72, exploring these arguments in detail.
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decide to admit the unconstitutionally obtained evidence under s. 24(2), yet use these
decisions to signal that, absent legislative authority, such stops will result in the exclusion of
evidence in the future. Assuming that Parliament will respond to such developments the way
it did when confronted with analogous rulings under s. 8, it will not take long for legislative
action to follow.
Obviously, the substance of any legislation so enacted would also be of pivotal
importance. It would be no solution if Parliament simply granted police express legislative
authority to detain for investigative purposes without also addressing the myriad of difficult
issues that go along with creating such a power (see Part IV above). In rejecting ajudiciallycreated investigative detention power, the Court could do much to ensure that Parliament
responds with the sort of comprehensive legislative scheme that is essential if police
detention practices are to be effectively regulated in the future.
First, to reduce the risk of Parliament simply enacting the investigative detention power
as is, the Court could signal its disinclination to fill the gaps that would be left by such a bare
bones response. It could make clear, for example, that it would not be prepared to use the
InterpretationAct as a means of reading in other powers - such as the use of force to effect
stops, the carrying out of protective searches, and the moving of suspects - or to imply an
2 s°
override of the right to counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) of the Charter.
The Court could
justifiably point out that because a statute authorizing investigative detentions would
"encroach on the liberty of the subject," it would "be construed, where ambiguous, in favour
of upholding such liberty."28' In effect, the Court could let it be known that if Parliament
wants an investigative detention power that does all of these things, it must create such a
power itself. The prospect that investigative stops might be invalidated and evidence
excluded because of such legislative shortcomings would likely be enough to prompt
Parliament to enact the sort of comprehensive legislation that is necessary if effective
regulation is to be realized.
Second, in rejecting a judicially-created investigative detention power, it would also be
sensible for the Court to seize this opportunity to signal to Parliament, in general terms, the
minimum constitutional requirements a legislative scheme would be required to meet. For
example, beginning with the threshold for investigative detentions, the Court could make
clear that a scheme which authorized stops based on anything less than articulable cause (that
is, reasonable suspicion) would probably run afoul of the right not to be arbitrarily detained,
282
as guaranteed by s. 9 of the Charter.
Of course, in legislating this standard, there would
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The federal Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21 would apply to any statutory investigative detention
power (ibid. s. 3(l)). Section 31(2) of that Act provides that "[w]here a power is given to a ...
officer
...
to do ...
any ...
thing, all such powers as are necessary to enable the person, officer or functionary
to do ...
the doing of the ...
thing are deemed to be also given."
Asante-Mensah, supra note 106 at para. 41. See also R. v. Colet, [1981 ]IS.C.R. 2, (1981), 57 C.CC.
(2d) 105 at 112-13: the Court applied this principle to explain its refusal to use the predecessor of what
is currently s. 31(2) of the InterpretationAct to imply a search power into a legislative provision that
only expressly authorized a "seizure" power.
The Supreme Court's existing s. 9 Charterjurisprudence requires that, at a minimum, any legislative
standard authorizing detention or imprisonment do so based on rational criteria or standards; see supra
note 46 and accompanying text. Anything less than reasonably-based suspicion - for example, an
officer's subjective suspicion alone - would probably violate s. 9. See also supra note 88, which
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be nothing stopping Parliament from elaborating upon its meaning for the benefit of police
officers in the field. Regulations could be used to promulgate the sort of guidelines that have
been developed in the United Kingdom which, among other things, attempt to explain in
practical terms what "reasonable suspicion" is and is not.283
The same could be done with any incidental search power. The Court could put Parliament
on notice that to comply with s. 8 of the Charter (for the reasons explored above in Part
IV(B)), a search power granted to police would probably need to be restricted to situations
where there is some objectively-based safety concern and be limited, at least initially, to
nothing more than a protective pat-down designed to locate weapons. Assuming these
minimum constitutional requirements are met, there is again no reason why Parliament could
not supplement such a power with practical guidelines to better direct its use in the field.2"4
Finally, as noted above, since the vast majority of unjustified stops do not result in the
acquisition of any evidence, they do not lead to the laying of charges. Therefore, the effective
regulation of police detention practices will further require that any legislative scheme
include procedures capable of minimizing both the occurrence and the impact of these lowvisibility encounters. Time limits on the length of detentions, a procedure for extending their
duration, and reporting requirements, are all essential if police detention practices are to be
effectively checked. Of course, for good reasons, there are limits on how far the Court can
go in shaping any legislative scheme enacted by Parliament. That said, legislation authorizing
investigative stops would undoubtedly intrude upon "liberty" and "security of the person"
so as to engage s. 7 of the Charter and require compliance with the "principles of
fundamental justice." ' 5 As a result, the adequacy of the procedural checks included in any
legislative scheme would ultimately be subject to review by the Supreme Court. Under the
existing s. 7 jurisprudence, the Court would have to decide whether the legislation enacted
strikes a constitutionally fair balance between the liberty interests of Canadians and the law28 6
enforcement interests of the state.
None of the above is intended to suggest that if Parliament responds with comprehensive
rules to confine and structure the exercise of police discretion, and combines those rules with
procedures capable of checking police detention practices, the courts will be left without any
role. On the contrary, the courts will still perform a number of critically important functions.
First, they will be required to consider challenges to Parliament's legislative scheme and
assess whether it in facts meets the Charter's requirements. In the process, the courts will
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explains the holding in Wilson, supranote 45, a Supreme Court decision which suggests that articulable
cause is probably the minimum permissible standard fora lawful detention to escape being labelled
"arbitrary" under s. 9.
See PACE, Code of Practicefor Stop andSearch, supra note 69, ss. 2.2 - 2.6, 2.25.
Ibid., ss. 1.5, 2.9 -2.11, 3.1 - 3.11, supplying detailed guidance on when searches can be undertaken,
as well as their manner and scope.
Supra note 40, s. 7.
Under its contemporary s. 7jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that "[tlo determine
the nature and extent of the procedural safeguards required by section 7 a court must consider and
balance the competing interests of the state and the individual" in the particular context. See ldziak v.
Canada(Minister ofiustice), [199213 S.C.R.631, (1992), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 65 at 85. See also Chiarelli
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] I S.C.R. 711, (1992), 72 C.C.C. (3d)
214 at 237.
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interpret the Charter's guarantees and further elucidate the minimum constitutional standards
governing investigative detention. Second, in individual cases, they will adjudicate claims
that s. 9 of the Charter was violated because the statutory requirements for a lawful detention
were not respected. Similarly, they will hears. 8 Charter claims regarding incidental searches
and determine whether the limits of the statutory search power were respected. Finally, the
courts will address any constitutional claims that are not subsumed within the legislative
scheme enacted. For example, the Supreme Court has previously indicated that s. 9 of the
Charter would be violated if an arrest (or, by implication, a detention) was undertaken
"because a police officer was biased towards a person of a different race, nationality or
colour, or that there was a personal enmity between a police officer directed towards the
'
person arrested."287
Even if Parliament chose not to include an express prohibition on racial
profiling in the legislative scheme, adjudicating any such claims would remain the function
of courts.
As this Part of the article makes clear, if the ultimate goal is the effective regulation of
police detention practices, there is a much better option than ajudicially-created investigative
detention power. The dialogue model, already embraced by the Supreme Court, offers the
solution. The next step, however, requires considerable courage: the Court must reject over
ten years ofjurisprudence. Yet, as one commentator observed, "... if the Court avoids taking
bold steps, chances are that the dialogue will never get off the ground and we will have
neither judicial nor legislative rules designed to maximize the fairness of the process."2 '
VI. CONCLUSION

Investigative stops are essential to the police. Police officers must be able to stop and
question individuals they suspect of criminal wrongdoing, without arresting them, if they are
to perform their difficult jobs effectively. As a result, regardless of their legal status, such
stops are an inevitable part of police practices. Just as inevitable, however, is the danger that
many stops will be undertaken without good cause or because of nefarious considerations,
such as an individual's race. All of this gives rise to an unavoidable tension: the police need
a power to carry out investigative stops, and the public requires real assurances that any such
power will be effectively regulated.
In Simpson, the Ontario Court of Appeal attempted to bridge the gulf between the
conventional common law rule that forbade any interference with individual liberty short of
arrest and the reality of police practices. In acting, the Court's stated goal was regulatory. To
that end, they applied the Waterfield test in order to recognize an investigative detention
power. But as was demonstrated above in Part 1Il, that test was never intended to be used as
a device for the judicial creation of new and invasive police powers. Nevertheless, the
ancillary powers doctrine supplied the faulty foundation upon which the entire investigative
detention experiment has been built.
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If the goal is to effectively regulate police detention practices, a judicially-constructed
power is destined for failure. As Part IV demonstrated, given the dynamic involved when
such a power is left to the incremental decision-making of judges, who only see those cases
involving the factually guilty "victims" of unjustified stops, the inevitable trend is towards
a continual, virtually boundless expansion of police power. In time, the effect is far from
regulatory. Rather, this approach tends to accomplish little more than blurring the distinction
between investigative stops and conventional arrests.
The simple truth is that, institutionally, courts are not capable of single-handedly
regulating police detention practices. The very nature ofjudicial rule-making is incompatible
with the creation of the sort of clear, comprehensive, and prospective rules that are essential
if police discretion is to be meaningfully structured and confined. Courts are similarly
incapable of developing the necessary administrative procedures to meaningfully check
police detention practices. Wishful thinking aside, ajudicially-created investigative detention
power cannot accomplish the goal of regulating police detention practices.
Reaching this conclusion does not require Canadian courts to wait patiently for a
legislative scheme that may never come. Rather, courts can take important steps to foster an
atmosphere in which the necessary legislation will emerge. As outlined in Part V(C), the
Supreme Court can kick-start the constitutional dialogue in relation to police detention
practices by taking two simple but important steps. First, the Court must finally hold that a
detention which lacks lawful authority - that is, an illegal detention - is necessarily
arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter. Second, the Court must reject opportunities to employ the
ancillary powers doctrine as a device for vesting the police with new and complex criminal
investigative powers. By implication, this would mean rejecting a judicially-created
investigative detention power. Unfortunately, as long as the courts maintain such a power,
Parliament will continue to lack the necessary incentive to enact the sort of legislation that
is essential if police detention practices are to be effectively regulated in the future.
It would be premature to pronounce the investigative detention experiment a failure. At
this point, the opportunity to vest the police with such a power while also effectively
regulating it remains open. Experience makes it clear, however, that a judicially-created
power is not the solution. Instead, comprehensive legislation is absolutely essential if police
discretion is to be meaningfully confined, structured, and checked. It is within the Supreme
Court's power to create an atmosphere in which such legislation will be forthcoming - one
in which the Court must take bold steps to initiate a truly constructive dialogue with
Parliament. If this occurs, the goal of effectively regulating police detention practices may
be realized in the foreseeable future. The experiment can still work, but it needs some serious
modifications.

